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IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS: ADMINISTERING
A "RADICAL" REMEDY
Rory Van Loot

Calls for breaking up monopolies-especially Amazon,
Facebook, and Google-have largely focused on proving that
companies like Whole Foods, Instagram, and YouTube are anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient attention to
a separatestep in the analysis that may help explain why the
government in recent decades has not broken up a single large
company. After establishing that an anticompetitive merger or
other act has occurred, there is great skepticism of breakups
as a remedy. Judges, scholars, and regulatorssee a breakup
as extreme, frequently comparing the remedy to trying to "unscramble eggs." They doubt the government's competence in
executing such a dtfficult task, pointing to decision-making
flaws dating back to the breakups of Standard Oil in 1911
and AT&T in 1984. Even scholars callingfor more vigorous
antitrust enforcement often recommend alternative remedies.
This Article asserts that the pervasive hesitancy about
administering breakups renders antitrustimpotent in the face
of monopolies-too often a statutory right without a remedy.
More importantly, the Article challenges the perception of
breakups as unadministrable. The intellectualfoundationsfor
the anti-breakup stance are weak, relying on outdated, anecdotal evidence. Moreover, antitrust needs a methodological
shift toward paying greater attention to the breakup insights
yielded by other disciplines. In particular, business scholars
have studied how the world's leading companies regularly
break themselves up voluntarily. Additionally, administrative
law scholarshiphas observed a broader evolution toward collaborative regulation that shows how the much-maligned historical approaches to antitrust remedies could be greatly
improved by relying more on the business sector in designing
and implementing breakups. In other words, insights from
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law
School Information Society Project. For valuable input, I am grateful to Rebecca
Haw Allensworth, John Newman, Menesh Patel, Georgios Petropoulos, Danny
Sokol, Ashwin Vasan, David Walker, and Ramsi Woodcock. Brianne Allan, Samuel Burgess, Leah Dowd, Derek Farquhar, Brian Flaherty, Shecharya Flatte, Ian
Horton, Ryan Kramer, Jack Langa, Tyler Stites, and Brittany Swift provided excellent research assistance.
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outside of antitrust address many critiques of breakups and
show how the remedy is farfrom radical and messy.
Antitrust observers should thus abandon the worldview
that compares breaking up prior companies to unscrambling
eggs. Or, at a minimum, they should recognize that scrambled
eggs, once cooked, are divided into smallerportions. A greater
willingness to do the same to monopolies in the post-merger
context and beyond would bring regulators more in line with
the business sector, which sees divestitures as a routinepart

of effective governance.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of bipartisan momentum to prosecute big tech
companies, antitrust authorities have acknowledged that
breakups are "perfectly on the table." 1 But this remedy faces
intellectual opposition from a broader range of the ideological
spectrum than many realize. Academics have driven a renais1 Rob Copeland, Breakup of Tech Giants 'on the Table,' U.S. Antitrust Chief
Says, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
breakup-of-tech-giants-on-the-table-u-s-antitrustchief-says-11571765689
[https://perma.c/9NXG-SXM2] (quoting Makan Delrahim, head of the DOJ Antitrust Division).
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sance in antitrust scholarship, calling for stronger remedies for
anticompetitive behavior, with some proposing breakups.2 The
breakup attention has focused on whether large corporations
are violating antitrust laws and how a given breakup would
alter competition once the process is complete. 3 Yet to pursue
breakups, policymakers must also believe that authorities can
administer them, and that the remedy is reasonable. Otherwise, courts would insist on another solution, such as mandating that tech companies provide competitors with access to
their platforms. 4 In the wake of intensifying scholarly scrutiny
of antitrust, there has been no sustained attention to administering breakups. 5
In the absence of close examination, the dominant view
has remained that breakups are "radical"6 and too costly-even
among influential scholars supportive of more vigorous antitrust enforcement. 7 The biggest conceptual barrier is the belief
that breakups are too difficult for the government to administer.8 As judges, scholars, and regulators have repeatedly put
2 Scholars have for decades called for reforming antitrust, in what can be
described as the Post-Chicago antitrust movement. See generally How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (sharing scholarship by Jonathan

Baker, Eleanor Fox, Herbert Hovenkamp, Marina Lao, John Kirkwood, Daniel
Rubinfeld, and Steven Salop, among others). Members of that group and the more
recent "Neo-Brandeisian" antitrust movement have called for expanding breakups. See TIM Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 132-33
(2018); Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J.
1962, 1982 (2018); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE

L.J. 710, 800 (2017).
3 See supra note 2.
4 See infra subparts I.B & IV.B.2.
5 See infra Part I (summarizing the literature).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("[W]isdom counsels against adopting radical structural relief."); Todd Spangler,
Will the U.S. Break Up Big Tech? Don't Hold Your Breath, VARIETY (June 4, 2019,
1:36 PM), https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/us-antitrust-break-upfacebook-google-amazon-apple-1203232588/ [https://perma.cc/2S6N-7NSS]
(quoting Professor Herbert Hovenkamp as saying "[b]reakup remedies are radical
and they frequently have unintended consequences").
7
See Herbert Hovenkamp, ProgressiveAntitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 99;
Fiona Scott Morton, Why 'BreakingUp' Big Tech Probably Won't Work, WASH. POST

(July 16, 2019, 2:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/
[https://
16/break-up-facebook-there-are-smarter-ways-rein-big-tech/
perma.cc/TE4W-N2F6] ("Just 'break them up' is an oversimplified sound bite, not
a real policy that would restore competition in digital markets and benefit
consumers.").
8 See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, ("The main reason antitrust does not go
further is concerns about administrability."); see also Menesh S. Patel, Merger
Breakups, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 975 (manuscript at 42, 50-51) (on file with the
Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paLaw
Cornell
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3469984 (concluding that more ex post merger reviews are
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it, breaking up a merged company is like trying to "unscramble

the eggs." 9
That administrative resistance to breakups is overlooked in
conversations about reforming antitrust, but it poses an existential problem. In theory, to combat monopoly power obtained through an illegal merger, authorities have long
preferred breaking up the company to the "perilous" alternative-behavioral remedies, which require ongoing government
oversight of the monopolist. 10 Yet if the preferred remedybreakups-has become so infeasible that "we may as well forget about attempting to disestablish" integrated firms, 1 1 the
law may offer no acceptable remedy to address illegal
monopolies.
Through an outside-of-antitrust lens, this Article challenges the prevailing assumption that breakups are extreme
and prohibitively difficult to administer. It contributes the first
review of the empirical evidence on the administration of breakups, showing that the studies largely responsible for the early
view of breakup administration as "clearly a disaster"12 suffer
from flawed methodologies. 13 Moreover, scholars' frequent critiques of breakups from decades ago, and sometimes more
than a century ago in the case of Standard Oil, have limited
relevance.1 4 Part of the problem is that large antitrust breaknecessary, but cautioning against breakups when entities have integrated their
assets because of "the fundamental difficulties of unwinding consummated
mergers").
9 See, e.g., Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("[O]nce the tender offer has been consummated it becomes difficult,
and sometimes virtually impossible, for a court to 'unscramble the eggs.'" (quoting
Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973))); see also Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Grp., Inc., 636 F. Supp.
1513, 1517 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (referring to the "virtual impossibility of 'unscrambling the scrambled eggs'"); William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of
Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 830
(1997) ("Once a merger takes place and the firms' operations are integrated, it can
be very difficult, or impossible, to unscramble the eggs and reconstruct a viable,
divestable group of assets."); F. David Osinski, Merger Remedies and the Undersupply of Economic Research, 18 ABA ANTITRUST L. SEC. ECON. COMM ITEE NEWSL.
5, 7 (2017) ("[I)n consummated mergers,. . . a divestiture may not restore competition due to the high cost and risk of unscrambling the eggs.").
10 Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming
Dual Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. CoMM. L.J. 167, 176 (2008).
11 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1982).

12 Barbara A. Clark, Merger Investigations at the Federal Trade Commission:
An Insider's View, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 774-75 (1987).
13 See infra subpart II.B.
14 See infra subpart II.A (explaining limitations in leading historical case
studies).
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ups have not occurred in decades, and were always rare, leaving an absence of recent data points.
Rather than relying on outdated and discredited antitrust
research, this Article situates breakups within their current
business and administrative contexts. Antitrust debates fail to
consider the insights generated by routine private sector breakups. One-third of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)-more appropriately termed reorganizations-are divestitures.1 5 These
divestitures include some of the largest deals of the last decade,
including Fox's sale of its 20th Century Fox production arm for
$71 billion to Disney, eBay's spinoff of PayPal, and HewlettPackard's decision to split itself down the middle to create two
of the one hundred largest U.S. companies.1 6 Despite meaningful differences, the prevalence of these deals alone is informative because what antitrust observers have come to view as
drastic is commonplace in the business world.
Moreover, scholars in other fields-notably strategic management, finance, and organizational behavior-have studied
voluntary private sector breakups extensively. 17 They have
shown how these voluntary divestitures add value and how
better process design can improve their implementation.1 8 Of
course, it is important to recognize that even if antitrust breakups are costly and lower the firm's value, they may be economically beneficial by deterring executives from pursuing
anticompetitive deals. 19 But by remaining disconnected from
the extensive business scholarship on divestitures, the antitrust literature has exaggerated breakups' costs and governmental incompetence in administering them.
15 Matthias F. Brauer & Margarethe F. Wiersema, Industry DivestitureWaves:
How a Firm's Position Influences Investor Returns, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1472, 1472
(2012).

16

See Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual PropertyRights in

Shaping Industry Structure, 72 vAND. L. REv. 1197, 1243 n.315 (2019); Anjanette
H. Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution in the
Crowd, 16 CARDOzo J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 379-80 (2015); Shira Ovide, Joann S.
Lublin & Dana Mattioli, Hewlett-PackardSet to Break Up 75-Year-Old Company,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hewlett-

packard-to-split-into-two-companies-1412592132 [https://perma.cc/9MPZN6TD]; Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/fortune500 [https://
perma.cc/4CLP-GXZ6] (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).

17 See Caterina Moschieri & Johanna Mair, Research on CorporateDivestitures: A Synthesis, 14 J. MGMT. & ORG. 399, 400 (2008) ("[O]nly by integrating
literature in finance, strategy and organizational behavior can we obtain a comprehensive picture of divesting modes, antecedents, mechanisms and

outcomes
18
19

.

. ..

").

See infra subpart III.A (reviewing the literature).
See infra Part III (covering deterrence and shareholder harm).
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Regulatory scholarship can also improve the antitrust conceptualization of breakups. Antitrust scholars focus far more
on ex post enforcement actions and legal cases, whereas scholars in environmental law and other regulatory fields extensively
analyze the monitoring of firms and design of regulatory
processes. 20 In particular, the literature in those other fields is
in dialogue with a prominent strand of research, associated
with administrative law, arguing for collaborative

governance. 2 1

Approaching breakup administration less as an adversarial law enforcement procedure and more as collaborative
governance could streamline the process, which would speak
to one of the biggest critiques of breakups: delay. Also, collaborative governance aims to leverage business sector expertise to
compensate for administrative agency sophistication shortfalls
and information asymmetries. Most concretely, this would
mean not only leveraging the monopoly's resources, but also
involving independent third-party M&A consultants. Thus, by
drawing on the collaborative governance literature it becomes
possible to see beyond the limitations that breakups faced decades ago and adopt a more realistic assessment of how they
would work today.
The implications of a more informed view of breakup administrability are far-reaching. A misguided view of breakups
may help explain what many observers see as decades of weak
antitrust enforcement, leading to charges that "the deck is
2 2 Executives know
stacked in favor of large powerful firms."
that if they execute an anticompetitive merger by quickly integrating the companies, antitrust enforcers or courts will fear
2 3 Ironically, unfounded
breaking up the resulting company.
fears of doing harm through breakups may lead to either harmful inaction or weaker remedies that are more likely to prove
wasteful. If widespread and unfounded resistance to adminisThis disconnect reflects the institutional design of different agencies. See
Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Fims in the Compliance Era, 119
20

COLUM. L. REv. 369, 436-40 (2019).
See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN21
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4-7 (1992) (offering a model of responsive

regulation); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) ("I propose a normative model of collaborative governance that seeks to respond to complaints about the failings of contemporary
regulation.").
22 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 714,
745 (2018).
23 See infra subpart III.C.
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tering breakups has contributed substantially to the presence
of monopolies, it has imposed considerable costs on society. 2 4
Once breakups are understood as a normal part of business affairs, and as capable of being co-administered with the
private sector, courts and enforcers can deploy them more
readily as an antitrust remedy. That shift helps to solve the
antitrust problem of what to do after an anticompetitive merger
has occurred. But it also informs debates about how to handle
monopolies that achieved their dominance in other ways. 2 5 At
the very least, the intuitive resistance to breakups needs to
end. Unless and until greater evidence is produced that breakups harm society, judges should be less hesitant to approve
breakups, enforcers less tentative to pursue them, and policymakers less resistant to write laws that deploy them.

I
THE ANTITRUST REMEDY CONUNDRUM

Breakups exist in a state of conceptual tension. They are
often described as the preferred antitrust remedy, yet they are
persistently avoided in practice. This Part outlines the underappreciated hostility to administering breakups.
A.

Breakups as the Favored Remedy

Antitrust remedies can be classified as behavioral or structural. Behavioral remedies-sometimes called conduct remedies-seek to make the monopolist take or stop taking some
action, such as providing product access to rivals or prohibiting restrictive contract clauses. 26 In contrast, breakups are a
structural remedy in which a company typically transfers assets-such as by selling a business unit or intellectual property
to another company-or splits itself into two or more pieces. 2 7
24 This is true whether one believes that the goal of antitrust law should be to
advance consumer welfare or something larger, such as reducing inequality. On
&

distribution and antitrust, see Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust,
CompetitionPolicy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 11 (2015); Lina Khan
Sandeep vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution
and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 235, 236-37 (2017); Rory van Loo,
Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 211, 213, 216 (2019). But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth
Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 1171 (2016) (challenging the idea that antitrust
will make society more equal).

25

See infra subpart

IV.C.

26 See John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S.
Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 636 (2013).
27

DIES

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REME-

6 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE], http://
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The pervasive skepticism about administering breakups is
overlooked in part because many judges, scholars, and antitrust authorities have asserted a preference for structural remedies over behavioral remedies. For long periods in antitrust
history, courts viewed structural remedies as the best way to
address anticompetitive mergers. As the Supreme Court observed over fifty years ago, "[d]ivestiture has been called the
most important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively
easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the forefront of a court's mind when [an anticompetitive merger] has
been found." 28 In the ensuing decades, courts have left intact
that basic idea that divestiture is the "most effective[ ] of antitrust remedies." 2 9
Antitrust enforcers are arguably the most important actors
in determining remedies because of the Court's observation
that "once the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts as to
30
The two primary
the remedy are to be resolved in its favor."
federal antitrust enforcers are the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). In the context of
merger remedies, FTC officials have cited "less oversight by the
3
agencies" as a reason for preferring structural remedies. 1 In a
2004 guidance document, the DOJ reiterated that it prefers
structural remedies "because they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement in
the market." 3 2
Those statements have left the impression that enforcers
have retained a strong preference for structural remedies in
merger review. In 2018, a federal judge considering a private
lawsuit to break up a company that merged six years earlier
observed that "the DOJ seeks divestiture in the vast majority of
cases like this one." 3 3 Putting aside for the moment the accuwww.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5RvvLWC].
28 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-31
(1961) (footnote omitted).
29

See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 614, 648 (E.D.

Va. 2018) (quoting E.I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 326); In re Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., No.

9300, 2005 WL 120878, at *50 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 2005).
30 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972) (quoting E.I. du
Pont, 366 U.S. at 334).

31

See Osinski, supranote 9.

32

U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 7

(2004) [hereinafter 2004 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE], http://www.justice.gov/

atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm [https://perma.cc/W873-DPE3].
33 Steves & Sons, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d at 648 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (applying the Clayton Act in a private action).
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racy of that statement, 3 4 the judge proceeded to reiterate the
Supreme Court's characterization of antitrust law as viewing
"divestiture [as] 'the remedy best suited to redress the ills of a

competitive merger.'

"3

For similar reasons as judges and enforcers, scholars have
also often stressed the superiority of structural remedies.
Structural remedies have the broadest support "in merger
cases, where divestiture is the natural remedy for breaking
apart what never should have been joined together in the first
place."3 6 The literature emphasizes that structural remedies
are "administratively considerably easier in that, once divestiture has occurred, the agency's job is largely complete." 3 7
More recently, Lina Khan argued that structural remedies
are superior to behavioral remedies in the context of a proposal
for platform separation legislation. 3 8 A separation mandate
would, for instance, prevent Amazon from both operating an
online marketplace and selling its own goods on that platform.
Khan points out that structural separation regimes have been
preferred to behavioral remedies because they are "highly administrable" and require less ongoing monitoring. 3 9
Thus, even as some progressive antitrust scholars have
called for a "new framework for holding private power to account," in which "[s]tructural remedies are to be preferred," 4 0
they engage with the issue of administering breakups, at most,
in passing. In those brief discussions, they understandably
echo in more modern contexts many of the same theoretical
reasons why courts have long claimed to prefer structural remedies. In light of the pervasive preferences expressed for structural remedies, it is understandable why the deep-seated
resistance to administering breakups has remained largely unacknowledged and unchallenged.
34 See infra subpart I.B.
35 Steves & Sons, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d at 648 (quoting California v. Am.
Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 285 (1990)).

36

Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization

Remedies, 76 ANTITRusr L.J. 11, 15 (2009); see also Steven C. Salop, Modifying
MergerConsent Decrees to Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, 31 ANTrrRUSr 15, 18
(2016) ("Divestitures are the standard remedy to preserve competition potentially
lost from the merger.").

37
38

Kwoka, supranote 26.
See Lina M. Khan, The Separationof Platforms and Commerce, 119 CoLuM.

L. REv. 973, 980 (2019).
39 See id. at 985-86, 1063-64, 1074-75.
40 Tim Wu, The Utah Statement: Reviving Antimonopoly Traditionsfor the Era
of Big Tech, MEDIUM: ONEZERO (Nov. 18, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/the-

utah-statement-reviving-antimonopoly-traditions-for-the-era-of-big-teche6be198012d7 [https://perma.cc/JZN5-5J421.
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Hostility to Administering Breakups

Despite the favored status of structural remedies in theory,
antitrust breakups have become rare in practice. Part of the
issue is that the statements of preference are relative rather
than absolute-even if authorities preferred structural to behavioral remedies, they may prefer inaction to both of those
remedies. Additionally, concluding that structural remedies
are generally superior to behavioral remedies does not bind the

government in any given case.
Another source of confusion is that in some antitrust contexts, divestitures are favored. Companies must obtain government approval for sizeable mergers, and authorities often
condition approval on the sale of part of the combined business. 4 1 However, those divestitures have, until recently,
tended to be small-such as a handful of gas stations that
would have resulted in local monopolies post-merger in specific
towns. 4 2 Whereas in a 1999 retrospective the highest price
paid for divested assets as part of merger approval was "more
than a hundred million dollars," 4 3 Instagram-if Facebook was
forced to divest it-would reportedly fetch a price of over a
hundred billion dollars.44
Even if large, pre-merger divestitures became common,
they form part of a reorganization that still makes the divesting
company bigger, not-as with breakups in other contextssmaller. Accordingly, although breakups can be of any size
and arguably include divestitures ordered during merger review, the term will be used herein to refer to a significant
breakup of a business outside of the merger approval process.
The government has not broken up one of the country's
largest firms since 1982, when it split AT&T into seven tele45
phone operating companies and a long-distance carrier.
However, the intellectual case against breakups had been
building long before. Since at least the mid-twentieth century,
courts have been wary of breaking up a unitary company. In a
landmark 1953 case, United States v. United Shoe Machinery
41
42

See infra subpart II.B (reviewing studies of government divestitures).

See infra subpart IV.A.

BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S
DIVESTTURE PROCESS 8, 18-19 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 DIVESTTURE STUDY] (study43

ing use of divestitures during merger review).
44 See Bernard S. Sharfinan, The Undesirability of Mandatory Time-Based
Sunsets in Dual Class Share Structures: A Reply to Bebchuk and Kastiel, 93 S. CAL.
L. REV. POSTscRIPr 1, 5 (2019).
45 See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 201, 224 (D.D.C. 1982).
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Corp., 4 6 the court described the government's request to dissolve a shoe manufacturer into three separate companies as
"unrealistic." 4 7 The court pointed out that United Shoe produced all shoes "at one plant in Beverly, with one set of jigs and
tools, one foundry, one laboratory for machinery problems, one
managerial staff, and one labor force. It takes no Solomon to
see that this organism cannot be cut into three equal and viable parts." 4 8
Much of the intellectual foundation of the opposition to
breakups comes from the Chicago School. These scholars have
theorized that it is quite difficult to know what makes a firm
appeal to consumers. 4 9 For instance, is Apple popular because
of its patents, clever marketing, the genius of Steve Jobs, or
something else? 5 0 Since courts and regulators are unlikely to
be able to figure such questions out, a governmental breakup
would risk ruining what consumers value most about the company. Thus, regardless of how monopoly power is obtained,
once it exists, a breakup risks undermining consumer welfare.
These scholars have also pointed out that this risk weighs
against breaking up monopolies who gained and maintained
their monopoly power by offering superior products rather than
through anticompetitive conduct. 5 1 The law does not allow for
breaking up such companies. 5 2 Stated otherwise, the government wants to avoid smashing success.
Scholars have also long criticized the government's realworld execution of breakups. 53 The main evidentiary foundations of their concerns are twofold. First, many critiques stress
the messiness of prior breakups.54 One cautionary tale is of
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
Id. at 348.
48
Id.
49
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTrRUST LAW 278 (2d ed. 2001); Harold Demsetz,
Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3
(1973); Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20
J.L. & ECON. 229, 236-37 (1977).
50 See Ramsi A. woodcock, The AntitrustDuty to Charge Low Prices, 39 CARDozo L. REV. 1741, 1746 (2018).
51
See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 49, at 4-5 (defending superior efficiency).
52 See infra subpart Iv.C (explaining and challenging this stance).
53 See, e.g., Emanuel Celler, The Trial Court's Competence to Pass Upon Divestiture Relief 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 693, 693 (1965) (describing criticisms of trial
judges' competence to issue remedies of divestiture for antitrust violations, in46

47

cluding being too busy or inexpert); Jerrold G. van Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 147, 147-48 (1950) (criticizing the DOJ's pattern of
too heavily searching for antitrust violators and too heavily relying on divestiture
as a remedy).
54 See infra subpart II.A (reviewing scholarly discussions of past breakups).
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5 5 After antitrust
the 1970 dissolution of El Paso Natural Gas.
authorities obtained a judicial order to break up the company,
implementation took seventeen years and three Supreme Court
5 6 Observorders urging the parties to proceed "without delay."
ers believe that these and other incidents raise doubts about
competence, as "courts' expertise lies in answering legal questions, not making [day-to-day] business decisions about questions such as pricing, product introduction, and investment in
risky ventures." 5 7
A second foundation for skepticism of divestiture administrability comes from empirical research. Several studies of
DOJ and FTC divestitures in the 1960s and 1970s found that
few divestitures contributed to competition, with the earliest
and most prominent of these examinations concluding that
58
divestitures "could not be branded anything but a failure."
Despite an already emerging intellectual hostility to breakups, the government proceeded with breaking up AT&T because it was an unusual case. The AT&T monopoly was
"substantially a creature of regulation and public intervention." 5 9 As a result, even those opposed to government intervention in private enterprise could see a breakup of the
company as consistent with their values. Moreover, the company had about ninety percent of the market for long-distance
calls and owned many local telephone monopolies nationwide. 6 0 Thus, if someone wanted to make a phone call to or
61
from much of the country, the only option was AT&T.
In the face of that government-created monopoly, Stanford
Professor William Baxter assumed leadership of the DOJ antitrust division and sought a dissolution. At the same time, Baxter was a "Chicago school economist"6 2 who thus preferred

55

See Michael C. O'Connor, Comment, Divestiture in Light of the El Paso

Experience, 48 TEX. L. REV. 792, 792 (1970).
56 United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (1964).

57

Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network

Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34 (2001).

&

58 Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L.
ECON. 43, 47-53 (1969); see also Malcolm R. Pfunder, Daniel J. Plaine & Anne
Marie G. Whittemore, Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 AIlTRUST BULL. 19, 20-21
(1972) (raising "substantial doubt about" divestiture).

59

William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Mis-

conduct, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1285, 1303 (1999).
60 See Robert W. Crandall, The Failureof StructuralRemedies in Sherman Act

MonopolizationCases, 80 OR. L. REv. 109, 186 (2001).
61
See id.
62 Richard A. Epstein, The AT&T Consent Decree: In Praiseof Interconnection
Only, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 149, 155 (2008).

2020]

IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS

1967

minimal governmental intervention and emphasized efficiency. 6 3 As he orchestrated the AT&T breakup, Baxter established the principles that would help ensure that another
would not happen for decades. 6 4 Baxter declined to pursue
breakups in a number of other cases-including IBM-and espoused a basic principle that "if 'there is no assurance that
appropriate relief could be obtained,' then the government
must question the value to consumers of prosecuting the antitrust case at issue." 65 That principle, created and embraced by
scholars, became akin to a "Hippocratic oath for antitrust enforcers and jurists." 6 6
That new cautionary approach to remedies, and to antitrust overall, was put to the test in the DOJ's case against
Microsoft in the 1990s and early 2000s. 6 7 The company supplied the operating system for over eighty percent of computers
and allegedly used that position to favor its own computer programs. 6 8 For instance, it required PCs to install Windows and
Internet Explorer. 6 9 In 2000, the government proposed separating the company's operating system from its software applications-thus creating two entities. 7 0 The district court agreed
to a breakup, mentioning deference to the government on the
issue of remedies after it established that Microsoft violated
antitrust law. 7 1

The Microsoft district court's choice of a structural remedy
attracted much attention among legal scholars. By the time
the Court of Appeals considered the case in 2001, many scholars had weighed in not only through amicus briefs, but
through law review articles that directly referred to the case. 7 2
Robert Crandall's 2001 study looked at divestiture cases
63

See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 665

(1998).

64

See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 57, at 2.

65

Id. (quoting In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1982)).

66 Id. n.5 (explaining how the new remedy "axiom has long influenced academic writings on antitrust and regulatory policy").
67

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000),

vacated, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
68 See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 73-74.
69 See id. at 45.
70 See id. at 48; Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d. at 62.
71 See MicrosoftCorp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
72 See, e.g., Proposed Conclusions of Law of Amicus Curiae Robert H. Bork,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232),
2000 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 14 (arguing that the findings of fact illustrate
that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act); Brief of Professor Lawrence
Lessig as Amicus Curiae at 1, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59
(D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), 2000 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3 (addressing "how

the law of 'tying' applies to an alleged tie of software products").
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against companies that-like Microsoft-had not obtained
their monopoly power through mergers. 7 3 It found that only in
four or five cases had courts ever ordered divestiture. It then
examined nine structural relief cases and concluded "that with
one exception, . . . there is very little evidence that such relief is
successful in increasing competition, raising industry output,
or reducing prices to consumers." 74 Moreover, in the lone exception-AT&T-Crandall posited that behavioral remedies
could have produced comparable results. 7 5 Crandall concluded that structural remedies to address monopolies like
Microsoft were unusual and very likely to fail. 7 6
In another 2001 article, Howard Shelanski and Gregory
Sidak analyzed the Microsoft context more directly and challenged the common remedy hierarchy in antitrust by observing
that "ambitious structural remedies that incorporate supervisory and behavioral elements might require as much, or even
more, continued judicial scrutiny as behavioral remedies require." 7 7 They urged the Microsoft court to tailor the remedy to
the context. 7 8 That argument posed a challenge to breakups
because behavioral remedies can be crafted that relate only to
the anticompetitive conduct, whereas a breakup does not as
directly address the anticompetitive action unless that action
was a merger. Thus, Shelanski and Sidak's proposal implied
that divestitures should only be applied to monopolies that
obtained their dominance through prior mergers-unlike
Microsoft. Also, Shelanksi and Sidak argued that the remedy
must "advance economic welfare at the lowest possible social
cost." 7 9 A cost-benefit calculation was unlikely to provide support for divestitures under the prevailing zeitgeist because, as
Richard Posner stated in a 2001 antitrust textbook, "Structural
remedies such as divestiture are, as we know, slow, costly,
[and] frequently ineffectual .... "80
In accordance with these and other scholarly views, the
Court of Appeals overturned the remedy chosen. 8 1 The court
73
74
75
76

See Crandall, supra note 60, at 109.
Id.
Id. at 109, 197.
Id. at 197-98.

77 Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 57, at 54.
78 Id. at 3 ("[A]ny remedy should address the conduct for which Microsoft was
found liable.").
79
Id.
80
POSNER, supranote 49.
81 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (revising
also the scope of the liability). Four eminent economists argued that Microsoft
should not be broken up because of administrability. See Remedies Brief of Amici

IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS

2020]

1969

acknowledged that divestiture "is indeed 'the most important of
antitrust remedies' "82 but noted that, because, Microsoft had
not obtained its monopoly power through anticompetitive
mergers, it was appropriate to proceed cautiously before ordering a breakup. 83
Several of the opinion's other points signaled a broader
decline in the stature of breakups. The court directly dismissed the idea of deferring to the government after it had won
its liability case. 8 4 More ominously, it described divestitures as
"radical" and argued that because Microsoft had not obtained
its monopoly power through mergers, the "logistical difficulty"
of splitting the company may weigh against divestiture. 85 From
the resistance to breaking up a single shoe production facility,
courts had evolved to skepticism about breaking up a company
even along two distinct but technologically linked product
lines. Finally, the court seemed to adopt the view of prominent
antitrust scholars encouraging a close tailoring- of the remedy
to the anticompetitive behavior. 86
By emphasizing that breakups' "long-term efficacy is rarely
certain," 8 7 the court painted uncertainty as cause for skepticism about breakups. That emphasis underscores how the
cost-benefit formulation weighs against breakups. It is easier
to identify the costs of a breakup than the competitive benefits.
After a breakup, there will often be clear increases in ongoing
operating expenses because, for example, Facebook and Instagram would need to have two headquarters rather than one.
Additionally, perhaps the most concrete and unavoidable category of costs in a breakup relates to the transition. Companies
cover moving expenses; hire reorganization specialists, such as
attorneys, accountants, and consultants; and absorb considerable employee time lost to managing and implementing the
reorganization rather than producing the company's core product. 8 8 Courts and enforcers must also devote resources to
monitoring and overseeing the breakup. 8 9
Curiae at 46-49, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C.
2000) (No. 98-1232).

82

Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 105 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961)).
83

See id.

84

Id. at 80-81.

85
86

Id. at 80, 106.
Id. at 107.

87 Id. at 80.
88 See, e.g., william M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV. 937, 953 (1981) (describing "heavy administrative" costs).
89 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 57, at 32-34.
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In contrast, it is "axiomatic" that the competitive benefits of
a breakup are difficult to predict. 9 0 Relatedly, it is challenging
to quantify the innovation and economic gains from two
smaller, more nimble companies. 9 1 Thus, whereas costs of a
breakup are undeniable, inevitable, and identifiable, the benefits are inherently uncertain. Given that uncertainty, the
Microsoft court's urging of "great caution"9 2 in adopting breakups-if taken literally-could alone make divestitures rare or
nonexistent by imposing an impossible evidentiary burden on
the government. Whether due to the court's resistance or political changes, the government subsequently decided not to pursue a breakup, instead settling for behavioral remedies. 9 3
The shift in thinking about remedies in the early 2000s,
albeit limited to merger remedies, can also be seen beyond the
courts. In its 2004 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger
Remedies, the DOJ announced that "[s]tructural remedies are
preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases." 9 4 However, in
its 2011 policy guidance, the DOJ provided a more measured
assessment of remedies in merger cases, declaring that "[iun
certain factual circumstances, structural relief may be the best
choice to preserve competition." 9 5 Antitrust enforcers went
from viewing behavioral remedies as "more difficult to craft,
more cumbersome and costly to administer, and easier than a
structural remedy to circumvent"9 6 in 2004 to seeing them as a
"valuable tool" in 2011.97 That shift occurred under the administration of President Barack Obama, who had promised "to

reinvigorate antitrust enforcement" by restructuring merger
review.98
90 Cf. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497,
1556 (2019) (describing the difficulty of predicting ex ante the effects of a merger).
91 See infra Part III (discussing possible diseconomies of scale).
92 Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 80; see also Timothy J. Muris & Jonathan E.
Nuechterlein, First Principles for Review of Long-Consummated Mergers, 5 CRTERION J. ON INNOVATION 29, 47 (2020) ("[I]f the government seeks to unwind a con-

summated merger, it must prove that the prospective benefits of that structural
remedy outweigh the prospective harms, including the costs and unintended consequences that often arise from corporate de-integration and inevitably increase
with time.").
93 See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d. at 98-103 (vacating the district court's remedies decree); infra section IV.B.1 (discussing political factors).
94
2004 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE, supra note 32.
95 2011 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE, supra note 27, at 4.
96 2004 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE, supra note 32, at 7-8.
97 2011 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE, supra note 27, at 6-7.
98 William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes
Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 904 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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A 2007 case illustrates the government's ambivalence regarding breakups. Seven years had passed since the anticompetitive purchase of a hospital, causing the FTC to decide
against a divestiture out of concern about the "potentially high
costs inherent in the separation."9 9 In the same opinion, the
FTC explained that "[d]ivestiture is the preferred remedy for
challenges to unlawful mergers, regardless of whether the challenge occurs before or after consummation."1 0 0
Thus, the rhetoric of preferring structural remedies sounds
more expansive than it is in practice. Once a few years have
passed since a merger, or the entities have integrated, the government is often reluctant to pursue a divestiture. In recent
decades, the professed preference for structural remedies
should have come with a caveat of "unless it would be costly or
messy."101
In short, deploying breakups as a remedy faces a considerable barrier beyond those that have been the focus in the budding literature fueling a revival of interest in antitrust. When
observers compare breakups to unscrambling eggs, they are
2
usually referring to the undoing of a consummated merger.10
Scholars and courts are even more resistant to splitting up
companies in other contexts.1 0 3
This harsh view of breakups has larger implications for
antitrust as an institution. Behavioral remedies are often
costly and messy.104 The theoretical preference for structural
remedies thus poses a dilemma for antitrust. Enforcers must
ask "whetherany remedy is sufficiently practicable to yield net
benefits" to determine whether a case should be brought at
all.10 5 In other words, the consensus is that if there is no
practicable remedy, the government should leave the monopolist alone.
When the most practical remedy available-a breakup-is
seen as a "clear[ ] . . . disaster"1 0 6 and "slow, costly, [and] frequently ineffectual,"1 0 7 the Hippocratic oath for antitrust en99

100

Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 375, 377 (F.T.C. 2007).
Id. at 523.

101 When consummated mergers are more recent in time, the preference may
hold.
102 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the egg metaphor).
103

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF

ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 156 (2d ed. 1999).

104

See infra subpart IW.B.

105
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Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 57, at 36 (emphasis omitted).
Clark, supra note 12, at 775.
POSNER, supra note 49.
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forcers would direct authorities not to act. 10 8 The primary
scholarly critique of antitrust law is the failure to act.1 0 9 As
Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison,
the government cannot be called a "government of laws .. . if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right."110 The view of breakups as the best remedy, but unworkable, makes it less likely that antitrust authorities will
take any action against monopolies.11
II
THE WEAK EVIDENCE AGAINST ADMINISTRABILITY

This Part examines the common assumption that breakups are too unwieldy by exploring its evidentiary foundations.
The point is not to debate the competitive impact of divestitures. The goal is instead to understand the literature on the
administrability of the breakup remedy. Even if we assume
breakups would increase competition once implemented, what
is the support for arguments that we cannot trust courts and
agencies to manage the process effectively?
A.

The Limitation of Case Studies

Narratives hold outsized influence on perceptions and beliefs."1 2 The narratives that loom largest in antitrust remedies
are of the major historical breakups, which caused many observers to sour on divestiture as a remedy.113 This Section
focuses on two of them. As "the mother of all monopolization
108 See Shelanski & Sidak,
standard).

supra note 57 (discussing the Hippocratic

109
See JOHN KwOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 158 (2014) (stating that errors in "clearing anticompe-

titive mergers" are "[flar more common" than erroneous "challenges to
competitively benign mergers"); Jonathan B. Baker, Jonathan Sallet & Fiona
Scott Morton, Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916, 1919 (2018)

("Concerns about the potential for under-enforcement are growing."); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L.

REV. 257, 269 ("The biggest danger presented by post-Chicago antitrust economics is .... that antitrust tribunals will be confronted with antitrust solutions that
they are not capable of administering."); Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 24, at 237
("[T]he antitrust counterrevolution .. . has produced monopolistic and oligopolistic markets and contributed to a captured political system .... ").
110 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
111 See infra Part IV (discussing breakups among other remedies).

112

113

See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 13 (2d ed. 2005).

william E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain
Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOwA L. REv. 1105,
1149 (1989) ("Fresh memories of the deconcentration experiences of the 1970s
have convinced many that the divestiture suit is a hopelessly flawed instrument of
antitrust policy.").
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cases,"11 4 Standard Oil15 holds sway in scholarly conceptions
of divestitures and is still debated. 1 16 AT&T,11 7 as the most
recent large breakup and "arguably the most significant antimonopoly case [in] the U.S.,"1 18 presumably demonstrates the
most advanced administration yet to be applied to a major
government dissolution. Both of these historical breakups
have been mentioned repeatedly in discussions of divestitures,
even decades after they occurred.119
The 1911 breakup of Standard Oil remains "iconic because
it was the first time antitrust was used to break up a company,
and at the time Standard Oil was the largest company in the
United States."12 0 In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the
company argued that its unitary nature made a dissolution
logistically impractical and dangerous to both the oil industry
and the economy more generally.121 "There are many parts,
but each part has its place, and if a part is taken out, the whole
structure is disintegrated," the company predicted.1 2 2 Those
warnings, if believed, would be fatal to breakups because antitrust seeks to increase the number of competitors and overall
industry output.1 2 3 Divested pieces cannot provide those benefits if they cease to operate.
The company's defense is noteworthy because critics of
breakups have long echoed it. Microsoft used similar arguments to overturn the court-ordered dissolution in 2001, citing
the impracticability of undoing its "unitary" organization. 12 4
114 Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253, 290 (2003).
115 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
116 See Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1300.
117 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
118 Howard Shelanski, Antitrust and Deregulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1922, 1945
(2018).

119 See generally, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolizationfrom
Standard Oil to Microsoft and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from
Elimination of Market Power to Regulation of Its Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 815 (2012)
(mentioning "Standard Oil" forty-four times and AT&T thirteen times); Kovacic,
supranote 113 (mentioning "Standard Oil" twenty-one times and "AT&T" thirteen
times).
120 Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429,
432 (2012).

121 Brief for Appellant at 191, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911) (No. 725) [hereinafter Standard Oil Brief].
122 Id.
123 See John M. Newman, Procompetitiue Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94
IND. L.J. 501, 517 (2019) (critiquing an "output-only" approach).
124

Microsoft Corp. Brief at 47, 53, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d

34, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212 and 00-5213), 2001 WL 34153358.
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The Court of Appeals also referred to that argument in overturning the breakup order. 125 One of today's leading progressive antitrust intellectuals, Fiona Scott Morton, has argued
against tech breakups based on integration, saying that "[b]y
the time any antitrust verdict is rendered, there will be one
coherent Facebook and no divisions to divest." 126
Standard Oil was correct that its breakup required "a number of complicated restructurings."1 2 7 The court order split the
company into "eleven large production and distribution companies" and "forced the spin-off of several smaller refining companies, pipeline companies, and even a tank car company." 128
Nonetheless, the dissolution of Standard Oil proceeded "relatively smoothly even though most of the newly independent
entities were deprived of the full-scale integration that Standard had argued was vital to their survival." 12 9 Even critics of
the breakup agree that the oil industry and the divested pieces
of Standard Oil thrived in the years after the breakup.1 3 0 We
do not know what would have happened otherwise, but Standard Oil's "warnings of industrial apocalypse"1 3 1 turned out to
be false.
To be clear, scholars still debate the efficiency benefits of
the dissolution.1 3 2 And the structure of Standard Oil was not
the worst-case scenario for divestitures. But the breakup succeeded, despite substantial restructuring challenges, in facilitating "the emergence of a number of substantial independent
competitors-including Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, and Mobilwhere there had been but a single firm before."1 3 3
Scholars have a more favorable impression of the competitive impact of the AT&T divestiture than that of Standard Oil,
with most thinking that AT&T's divestiture was overall beneficial.1 3 4 However, its administration came under withering
scholarly attack soon after completion. The main critique was

125
126

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Scott Morton, supranote 7.

127

Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1301.
HOVENKAMP, supranote 103, at 300.

128

Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1298.
See, e.g., Crandall, supranote 60, at 112 (seeing limited impact).
131 Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1298.
132 See Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart II, Tarring the Trust: The
PoliticalEconomy of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. PosrscRipT 23, 31-32 (2012).
133 Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1300, 1302.
134
See, e.g., Crandall, supranote 60, at 186; Kovacic, supra note 59.
129

130
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targeted at the degree of court involvement.1 3 5 It took ten years
to get from the government's original filing of the lawsuit to the
divestiture order, "spanning four Congresses, three Presidents,
and two U.S. district court judges."1 3 6 That order then began a
period of extensive court monitoring and follow-up legal battles. About "thirty-five to forty separate waiver requests were
filed per year in the first eight years of the decree," often taking
years to resolve. 13 7 Some scholars have described the AT&T
divestiture as a "failure," either because of the extensive costs
and delays of relying on the court or due to flawed decision
making by government officials who were tasked with running
a business.1 3 8 Like with Standard Oil, it is also impossible to
know what would have happened had the government not broken up AT&T. 139
As some perspective on these critiques, AT&T involved perhaps the largest set of divestitures in history.1 4 0 It thus provides an extreme example of a large-scale and diffuse breakup.
Moreover, as the discussion above illustrates, much of the administrability concerns center on the court's involvement.
Thus, to the extent that the case furnishes arguments against
breakups, it is against a breakup heavily managed by the
courts.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the Standard
Oil, AT&T, or other historical dissolutions were perfect. As with
most any large-scale project from long ago, whether in the private or public sector, hindsight enables observers to identify
improvements. However, it would be perplexing if these cases
continue to shape perceptions of divestitures. They are decades, and in the case of Standard Oil over a century, old.
Similarly, to cite the United Shoe impracticability of splitting up
a single shoe factory as evidence of breakup ineptitude lacks
analytic rigor and is anachronistic because today's large shoe
companies no longer produce their shoes out of a single
factory. 14 1
135 See, e.g., Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Losing by JudicialPolicymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 261
(1985).
136

Id.

at 225.

137 Crandall, supra note 60, at 114-15.
138 See MacAvoy & Robinson, supranote 135, at 246 (citing judicial judgment
mistakes); Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 57, at 53 (urging divestiture caution
based on AT&T).
139 See, e.g., Crandall, supranote 60, at 115 (exploring alternatives).
140 Kovacic, supranote 59, at 1302.
141 See Amit Singh, Nike Manufacturing and Supply Chain Strategies, MKT.
REALIST (Oct. 17, 2019), https://marketrealist.com/2019/10/nike-manufactur-
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It should also give critics pause that decades after the
breakup of AT&T, which by all accounts was followed by innovation, lower prices, and considerable competition, leading antitrust and telecommunications scholars cannot agree on
whether the breakup represented "a policy success or a policy
failure." 14 2 At a minimum, the subsequent world leadership of
U.S. telecommunications companies and the prosperity of oil
companies indicates that even lengthy and messy breakups
can still be followed by trailblazing innovation and intense
competition.1 4 3 Especially without considering how better design could address any flaws in past breakup administration,
the historical record of prominent divestitures should not be
cited as reason to condemn large-scale breakups today.
B.

The Lack of Systemic Evidence

Beyond case studies, several more quantitative examinations from the 1960s through the 1980s influenced observers
14 4 The most
to see divestitures as "notoriously ineffectual."
recent and comprehensive study during that time period, by
Robert Rogowsky, came to similar conclusions as the previous
45
one that had painted a "bleak" picture of antitrust remedies.1
Rogowsky analyzed over one hundred government antitrust
cases. 14 6 Like the other early influential empirical studies,
Rogowsky's did not analyze market data or consumer welfare.
Instead, he identified success as a divestiture that "reestablishes the acquired firm (1) independent of the parent, (2) viable
in the long run, and (3) adequately structured to be an effective
competitor."1 4 7 Based on these characteristics, and other factors such as the length of time of the divestiture, Rogowsky
classified seventy-five percent of the divestitures as either defiing-and-supply-chain-strategies/ [https://perma.cc/5JLH-AL85 ("Nike's manufacturing network has over 525 factories in 40 countries.").
Christopher S. Yoo, The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A
142
Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 61 FED. CoMM. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2008).

143

See James W. Brock, Economic Power, Henry Simons, and a Lost Antitrust

Vision of Economic Conservatism, 58 S.D. L. REV. 443, 452 (2013) ("[I]t is well to

remember that the telecommunications revolution of recent years-wireless, cell,
smartphones, satellite, etc.-exploded after the breakup of AT&T's telecommunications monopoly in the 1980s, not before.").
144 Clark, supranote 12, at 774; see also David Balto, Lessonsfrom the Clinton
Administration:The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV,
952, 958 (2001).
145 See Robert A. Rogowsky, The Economic Effectiveness of Section 7 Relief, 31
ANIrTRUST BULL. 187, 212 (1986).
146 Id. at 189.
147 Id. at 190.
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cient or unsuccessful, with twenty-eight percent falling into the
worst category, unsuccessful. 14 8
Rogowsky's metrics for assessing divestitures merit closer
scrutiny. Divestitures were labeled as unsuccessful if the purchaser of the vertically divested assets had over ten percent of
the relevant market.1 4 9 Not only does owning this much of the
market fall far short of proving a monopoly, but this example
indicates the study's heavy reliance on industry structure to
measure competition. This and other measures of competition
used by Rogowsky, such as whether the purchaser was in the
Fortune 200,150 have since been discredited as insufficient bases for establishing a lack of competition.151 Thus, Rogowsky
labeled divestitures as unsuccessful for having characteristics
that are well-known today to be perfectly consistent with a
divestiture that improves competition.
Additionally, Rogowsky labeled as unsuccessful any divestiture that ordered an insufficient size of assets divested-called
partial divestitures.1 5 2 Also, many cases were classified as unsuccessful because the DOJ or FTC did not order any divestiture, or ordered a token amount.15 3 In other words, if the
enforcers had sought larger-scale divestitures, their success
rate would have significantly improved by Rogowsky's metrics.
A study that played an important intellectual role in arguments
against divestitures instead is perhaps better viewed as indicating that the government should pursue more extensive
breakups.

Using a different methodology, the event study, James Ellert's examination of divestitures through the 1970s drew similarly harsh conclusions. Ellert examined the shareholder
returns of firms subject to antitrust divestitures before and
after those interventions.154 If divestitures were successful,
Ellert expected the divesting firms to offer lower stock market
returns and dividends after the antitrust intervention relative
to other companies not subject to such interventions. However, Ellert found no significant difference in the returns of
148
149
150
151

See id. at 189, 196, 212.
See id. at 189, 196, 218.
See id. at 196.

See generally, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to The Neal Report
and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POLY INT'L 219 (2009) (chronicling the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm).
152 Rogowsky, supra note 145, at 195.
153 Id. at 209, 228.
154 James C. Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715, 715 (1976) (examining firms challenged between 1950 and
1972).
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divesting companies compared to the returns of companies
with different outcomes, such as those whose antitrust cases
were dismissed.1 5 5 Moreover, Ellert was unconvinced that anything the antitrust authorities did as part of their merger evaluation program effectively reduced any monopoly gains.
Although the stock value of companies subject to antitrust
suits dipped by 1.6%, Ellert interpreted that drop as resulting
56
from legal and other costs of such actions.1
Rogowsky's study helps clarify Ellert's findings. A large
number of divestitures never happened, took many years to
implement, or required divestiture of only a small slice of assets.1 5 7 Also, Ellert's interpretation of the 1.6% drop as being
attributable to the costs of antitrust action is speculative and
reflects an average loss.1 5 8 Ellert's study is consistent with
some subset of more extensive and well-designed divestitures
reducing stock market returns.
A final shortcoming in Ellert's methodology is the limited
value of stock market returns as a metric of anticompetitive
earnings. Anticompetitive activities may not always yield
higher profits or increase the value of the firm. 159 As a result, if
the antitrust authorities' actions had improved competition,
the improvements may not be seen in stock market returns.
Even assuming those earlier studies' methodologies were
rigorous, there is further reason to doubt their findings' relevance today. The FTC examined the administration of U.S.
divestitures of all merger orders between 2006 and 2012.160
The success rate for structural remedies was eighty percent,
with success defined as ultimately at least restoring competition.161 Moreover, the unsuccessful cases resulted from the
FTC divesting piecemeal assets.' 6 2 When the FTC instead
divested an ongoing business operation, all of the divestitures
155
156

Id. at 715-16, 724.
Id. at 724, 729.

157
158

Rogowsky, supra note 145, at 195.

Ellert, supranote 154, at 724-29.
159 For instance, in theory, the firm may compete away the monopoly rents.
Or, if employees (including executives) captured the rents for higher salaries,
successful antitrust interventions would not hit shareholder profit. See Crane,
supra note 24, at 1192.
BUREAU OF COMPEITION & BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE
160
MERGER REMEDIES 2006-2012 (2017).

161

FrC's

Id. at 18 (horizontal mergers). A minority of cases required over two or

three years. See id. at 15, 18.

162 See id. at 1-2, 23-24 (including intellectual property, technology, brand
names, research and development, and equipment).
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succeeded. 163 Therefore, the category of divestitures most relevant to breakups consistently succeeded.
The success rate of pre-merger divestitures is not a perfect
comparison in terms of administering breakups, in part because they tend to be smaller scale.164 Regardless, these findings further undermine the prior empirical studies many have
cited as evidence that antitrust authorities administer structural remedies poorly. In particular, because they considered a
much later timeframe, the FTC's studies appear to reflect enforcers' and courts' improved approaches to administering
divestitures by incorporating lessons learned in the intervening

decades.

165

More recent quantitative studies provide mixed results.
Based on stock market returns, an examination of European
Union (EU) pre-merger divestitures concluded that divestitures
did not lead to significant declines in the stock prices of the
firms ordered to divest, but that rivals benefited from those
divestitures.1 66 However, besides the weakness of stock market value as a metric of antitrust effectiveness, the authors'
conclusions provide limited evidence for or against breakups as
a remedy because they were most critical of the excessive use of
partial divestitures as remedies. They believed enforcers
should go further by fully blocking mergers, 16 7 an intervention
that is more akin to a large-scale breakup from a competitive
perspective. Stock-market-based studies of uninhibited breakups could show a stronger impact on competition.
A central limitation of the above examinations is that they
fail to deploy the most respected empirical mechanism for establishing causality: randomization. 16 8 The difficulty of know163

Id. at 1, 5. Success meant competition "remained at its pre-merger level or

returned to that level within . .. two to three years." Id. at 15.

164 See supra subpart I.B. Also, for a pre-merger divestiture order, the companies can refrain from pursuing the proposed merger if they think the ordered
divestiture would be harmful. This means that the private sector retains a degree
of discretion-a check on incompetent administration-that it lacks in the case of
other types of antitrust divestitures. However, there is limited evidence that the
private sector has rejected government-ordered divestitures, and it would in any
case be difficult to know whether a private-sector rejection meant the anticompetitive dimensions of the deal had been removed. Arguably, to the extent the
rejection rate is low, it may actually strengthen the case for governmental competence in designing effective divestitures.
165 See 1999 DIvESrTURE STUDY, supra note 43, at 39.
166 See Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler & Burcin B. Yurtoglu, How Effective is
European Merger Control?, 55 EUR. EcoN. REv. 980, 995 (2011).
167 Id. at 1002.

168

Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues in the Review of Medical Research on

Human Subjects, 1 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 8 (1991) ("[R]andomization is often
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ing the counterfactual thus undermines all of these antitrust
empirics. One study addresses that methodological shortcoming by considering the Dutch government's use of randomization in ordering divestitures by gasoline companies of stations
along major highways.1 6 9 The divested gas stations were found
to lower prices by 1.3 to 2.3%.170 The narrow market context,
hospitable nature of gas stations to ownership transfer, and
foreign jurisdiction heavily limit these findings' relevance to
U.S. divestitures. Nonetheless, the most methodologically rigorous study available for determining causality indicates that
divestitures can improve competition in some contexts.
Finally, none of this review's empirical studies consider
deterrence.171 If breakups deter firms from pursuing monopolistic mergers, they could improve consumer welfare even if the
divestiture itself-analyzed narrowly in terms of the immediate
price effects in the specific market-did not yield evidence of
improved competition. As a result, some of the divestitures
labeled "failures" by Rogowsky or found to have had only a
minimal impact on stock price by Ellert could-once deterrence
is taken into account-be viewed as successful.
In summary, the most influential studies shaping pessimism about governmental administration of breakups relied on
questionable methodologies and are outdated. The research is
limited by the lack of sophisticated quantification of the effects
of divestitures on consumer welfare, the failure to consider
deterrence, and the absence of large breakups in the past few
decades. More recent studies even provide grounds for cautious optimism that larger, government-ordered divestitures
may yield high success rates. Some additional comfort comes
from the absence of disaster despite an array of government
interventions to separate large firms-including electric companies, railroads, banks, movie theaters, and television companies, among others.1 7 2 In addition, bankruptcy courts
absolutely essential to a study's design as a means of ensuring against any bias in
treatment assignment.").
169 Adriaan R. Soetevent, Marco A. Haan & Pim HeiJnen, Do Auctions and
ForcedDivestitures IncreaseCompetition?Evidencefor Retail GasolineMarkets, 62
J. INDUS. ECON. 467, 467-70 (2014).
170 Id. at 469.

171 See, e.g., Rogowsky, supranote 145, at 189 (empirical study of 104 merger
cases did not account for any non-beneficial deterrence caused by antimerger
enforcement). Over-deterrence is also problematic.
172 On these industries, see Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding
Company Act a Model for Breaking Up the Banks that are Too-Big-to-Fatl?, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 821 (2011); Khan, supra note 38, at 1037-51; Barak Orbach, The
Paramount Decrees: Lessonsfor the Future, 19 ANTrRUST SOURCE 1, 2-4 (2020).
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regularly order divestitures. The limitations in evidence despite diverse breakups demonstrate the speculative nature of
claims about the government being too incompetent to administer breakups.
III
A BALANCED VIEW OF BREAKUPS

Given the limited evidentiary foundations for harsh perceptions of breakup administration, the hostility to that remedy
deserves fresh examination. This Part widens the lens on
breakups by situating them in their broader business and law
enforcement contexts. The literature on private sector divestitures and the goals of antitrust regulation are in tension with
core assumptions that breakups are too extreme, complicated,
and harmful.
A.

Insights from Private Divestitures

Antitrust scholars have largely ignored research concerning an even more numerous category of divestitures: those in
the private sector. As a threshold matter, it is helpful to recognize the frequency of private divestitures. In the midst of a
growing economy and strong stock market, a 2019 survey of
senior corporate and private equity executives found that
eighty-four percent of respondent companies were planning a
voluntary divestiture within the next two years.1 7 3 Well over
three thousand private divestitures occur each year.1 7 4 In contrast, the FTC listed only ten divestiture orders annually to
alter proposed or consummated mergers in its latest divestiture
study, or less than one percent of all mergers and acquisitions. 17 5 If for no other reason, the universe of private sector

divestitures merits attention because of the considerably larger
volume of cases to study.
173 PAUL HAMMES, EY, GLOBAL CORPORATE DIVESTMENT STUDY 2019 2, 4 (2019),
https: / /assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/engl/topics/divestment/
2019/globaldivestmentstudyreport.pdf [https://penna.cc/57P-ASWF] (re-

porting survey results from 930 senior corporate executives and 100 private equity executives).
174 See Paula Loop, When a Piece of Your Company No Longer Fits: What
Boards Need to Know About Divestitures, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (July
27, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/when-a-piece-of-yourcompany-no-longer-fits-what-boards-need-to-know-about-divestitures
[https://

perma.cc/Z5AE-NXB5].
175 See 1999 DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 43, at 9.
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Are PrivateDivestitures Too Different To Be Helpful?

The antitrust scholarly omission of private divestitures is
to some extent understandable. After all, there are many differences between the two types of divestitures. Most importantly, antitrust divestitures aim to lessen a potential source of
monopoly profits, whereas private divestitures aim to increase
76
the value (including the long-term profits) of the company.1
Antitrust scholars might resist comparisons due to that distinction-and because it changes the composition of divestitures-making it less likely, for instance, that private
7 7 Addidivestitures will create two horizontal competitors.1
tionally, a portion of private sector divestitures are conglomerates selling unconnected businesses. These differences
indicate boundaries for finding antitrust lessons in private
divestitures.
However, to observe that there are differences between private and public divestitures, and that we must limit inferences
accordingly, is to state the obvious. The more challenging
question is how much the differences matter in light of the
project. Since the project here is to shed greater light on antitrust breakups from a starting point of limited evidence, the
existing differences warrant further examination.
Resistance to comparing public and private divestitures
due to the prevalence of private equity sales of conglomerate
pieces in private divestitures would reflect an outdated view.
Even in the 1980s and 1990s, a large portion of private divestitures were not by conglomerates.1 7 8 Since then, the field has
shifted considerably. Observers traditionally saw private divestitures as helping bring firms "back to their basics" by shedding
79
peripheral assets, often during times of financial distress.1
Over time, executives have increasingly pursued larger divesti176 Consequently, antitrust breakups may be more likely to destroy shareholder value than strategic reorganizations-a possibility addressed below. See
infra subpart III.C (discussing shareholder value and deterrence).
177 Relatedly, historically many divestitures were of bad assets, which are
unlikely to weaken the firm's competitive position. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse
of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. Bus. REv. 61, 63 (1989).
178 Even in the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of divested units operated in
the same industry as the parent. Hsiu-Lang Chen & Re-Jin Guo, On Corporate
Divestiture, 24 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 399, 411 (2005) (finding that 36% of
divestitures between 1985 and 1998 were of assets within the same industry by
two-digit SIC code). The percentage of non-conglomerate sales could be higher or
lower than this figure, given the limitations of industry codes.
179 Donald D. Bergh, Restructuringand Divestitures, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 1, 6 (2017). See generally Id. at 1-29 (summarizing the literature).
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tures for strategic reasons rather than to offload unproductive
and peripheral parts.1 8 0 Strategic motives include cost-cutting, the advantages of a leaner organization for innovation,
and long-term growth.181 Some businesses have become so
large and unwieldy that they are beyond the point of gaining
economies of scale, and their larger size instead creates diseconomies of scale-or increased costs resulting from their
size. 1 8 2

By way of illustration, in 2012 Pfizer announced it would
divest about forty percent of its business as part of a refocusing
on human medicine development.18 3 The company proceeded
to shed assets that provided synergies in terms of research and
distribution. It split off its animal health unit, which develops
animal medicines, in a $13 billion initial public offering
(IPO).184 As another example, Hewlett-Packard executives
opted for a breakup to respond to the increasing pace of technology-driven markets. CEO Meg Whitman described the
strategy by observing, "Being nimble is the only path to winning."1 8 5 The expansive motives for pursuing divestitures and
the diversity of assets separated mean that private divestitures
offer many case studies that are potentially relevant to various
antitrust breakup contexts.
As to the observation that private divestitures differ by
aiming to increase the firm's value, that distinction speaks
more to the goals rather than to the administration. If the
private sector demonstrates success splitting up large inte180 Moschieri & Mair, supranote 17, at 399 (describing divestiture as "a means
to correct or reverse previous strategic decisions [(for example, diversification)], or
a proactive strategic option").
181 Bergh, supra note 179, at 7-10 (listing motivations for enterprise-wide
reorganizations).
182 See Jesse W. W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law from the
Economic Crisis:The Prospectfor Antitrust Responses to the "Too-Big-To-Fail"Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 315 (2011); see also Jeremy C.
Kress, Solving Banking's "Too Big to Manage" Problem, 104 MINN. L. REV. 171,

208-09 (2019) ("A sizeable body of research refutes evidence of economies of scope
in financial services.").
183 See Seemantini Pathak, Robert E. Hoskisson & Richard A. Johnson, Settling Up in CEO Compensation: The Impact of Divestiture Intensity and Contextual

Factors in Refocusing Firms, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1124, 1125, 1127 (2014);
Michael J. De La Merced, Pfizer Spins Off Animal Health Unit in $2.2 Billion I.P.O.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013, 5:56 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/
31/pfizer-spins-off-animal-health-unit-in-2-2-billion-i-p-o/ Ihttps://perma.cc/
8Z4A-5DZV.
184 De La Merced, supranote 183; see also Imran Ahmed & Kasra Kasraian,
PharmaceuticalChallenges in Veterinary Product Development, 54 ADVANCED DRUG
DELIVERY REVIEWS 871, 878-79 (2002) (noting some of Pfizer's developments).
185 Ovide, Lublin & Mattioli, supra note 16.
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grated companies, that experience can provide insights into
how or whether antitrust authorities should do something similar, even if the goals for the breakup are different. For instance, Fiona Scott Morton's skepticism about a FacebookInstagram breakup, based on the observation that those two
companies would be integrated by the time the breakup occurred, echoes the view of many antitrust scholars. 186 Indeed,
following approved mergers, antitrust authorities have only secured two real post-merger divestitures since. 2001-and each
occurred within three years of the merger. 18 7 If the source of
resistance is the degree of integration rather than the particular shape, it is relevant to probe how the private sector has
approached the divestiture of companies integrated to a comparable degree.
A note is in order on what is meant by integrated. In the
case of Facebook and Instagram, the most compelling integration that gives critics pause is the technical interface of platforms-such as the code that enables users on one platform to
message users on another. 188 Even if integrated, the two social
media platforms would still under normal circumstances operate as distinct business units within the company, supported
by common company-wide functions. Also, consumers would
continue to be able to interact with the two integrated platforms as distinct products, in the sense of being able to use one
and not the other.
If observers are searching for divestiture case studies to
understand a given possible antitrust breakup, some of the
tens of thousands of private sector breakups in recent years
could-from an administration standpoint-offer some appeal.
Many involve the separation of horizontal businesses, technology companies, and prior mega-mergers. Especially on the
question of splitting up previously integrated digital companies, private divestitures offer arguably more relevant case
studies than the AT&T or Standard Oil breakups that tend to
dominate antitrust discussions.
The point is not that any particular private sector divestiture is a clear model for any particular proposed breakup, such
as the eBay-PayPal merger and subsequent divestiture as a

See Scott Morton, supra note 7.
187 See Patel, supra note 8, at 16, 19-20.
188 See Facebook to Integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger, BBC (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47001460
[https://
perma.cc/5DGR-VZJV].
186
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roadmap for Facebook-Instagram. 18 9 Large divestitures, publie or private, tend towards uniqueness. Observing that a given
proposed private sector breakup is different from any given
public sector breakup misses the point.
The point in discussing the integration-related resistance
to the Facebook-Instagram breakup is to diagnose the type of
concern that is prevalent in antitrust discussions of breakups.
A big part of that broader resistance is not about the particularity of the proposed breakup at hand. Instead, many observers demonstrate an abstract and generalized concern about
breaking up consummated mergers-or breaking up the company once it is integrated. 19 0 Those concerns should be informed by a set of business questions about how costly,
lengthy, and difficult it would be to break the particular company up-not the extent to which a prior merger is consummated or integrated.
In other words, for antitrust scholars to recognize what the
field can gain from a more interdisciplinary perspective on
breakups, it is necessary to exit the antitrust silo that inclines
toward labeling private sector divestitures as different. A more
productive approach is to examine whether the points of commonality yield insights. Although the differences are real, it
would be misguided to use them as a justification for ignoring
private divestitures altogether. Since the private sector has
undertaken divestitures of integrated companies with great frequency, study of those undertakings can speak to key business
assumptions that have implicitly shaped breakup skepticism.
2.

What Insights Might PrivateDivestitures Offer?

One key difference between private sector and antitrust
views of divestitures is how to view the downsides of splitting
up an integrated company. Executives who are deciding
whether to divest-and business scholars who study those
divestitures-are less deterred by the associated risks and
costs than observers of antitrust breakups. For instance, while
the private sector also prefers to sell a separate business unit
rather than one that is heavily intertwined, 19 1 many strategic
divestitures split integrated businesses whose information
189

See Bergh, supranote 179.

190

See supra subpart I.B.

191 See Irene M. Duhaime & John H. Grant, Factors Influencing Divestment
Decision-Making: Evidence from a Field Study, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 301, 302
(1984).
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technology systems have been intertwined for decades.192
Hewlett-Packard was a fully integrated company-the type of
unitary company that deters courts and enforcers from breakups-when it decided to split into two roughly equal halves.1 9 3
Executives pursue such strategic breakups despite awareness of the expenses and complexity.1 9 4 Again, Hewlett-Packard executives predicted that the divestiture would take several
years to complete, cost $1.8 billion, require extensive administrative management, and cause great internal upheaval.1 9 5
They proceeded despite that awareness and produced two
highly profitable companies. 196
What about in the context of technology-heavy deals? Antitrust scholars have urged particular caution in pursuing postmerger breakups in that space. 197 The private sector has no
such reservations, pursuing a number of divestitures years
after consummation. Examples include PayPal and eBay,
which had technologically integrated their platforms by the
time the combined company decided to split, and AOL-Time
Warner.19 8
Shareholders provide another perspective because they
also demonstrate relative comfort with divestitures. Following
unprofitable mergers and acquisitions, shareholders regularly
pressure their managers to undo those consummated mergers
192 See, e.g., Stephanie Overby, How CIOs Unravel IT Systems After a Business
Divestiture, CIO (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:00AM), https://www.cio.com/article/
2378617/how-cios-unravel-it-systems-after-a-business-divestiture.html [https:/
/perma.cc/8W5Z-M3NJ] (describing the Hess integration).
193 See Ovide, Lublin & Mattioli, supra note 16 (describing the divestiture).
194 See Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr., Emilie R. Feldman & Evan Rawley, The
Costs of Refocusing: Evidence from Hedge Fund Closures During the Financial
Crisis, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1268, 1271, 1287 (2019) (summarizing prior research on the well-known costs of reorganizing).
195 See Chris Matthews, Here's How Much HP's Split is Going to Cost, FORTUNE
(May 22, 2015, 8:05AM), https://fortune.com/2015/05/22/hp-split-cost
[https://perma.cc/KL53-JQQYI; Robert McMillan, Hewlett-Packard Officially
Files to Split, WALL STREET J. (July 1, 2015, 7:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/hewlett-packard-officially-fies-to-split-1435783640
[https://perma.cc/
Q3MK-T4Z5].
196 See Ovide, Lublin & Mattioli, supra note 16.
197 See, e.g., Patel, supra note 8, at 63 (concluding that technology mergers
may be extremely difficult to separate after a significant amount of time from
consummation); Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of
Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
41, 90 (2004) (explaining how in "high-tech markets, it is often impossible to
separate out the assets of the merged parties following close").
198 On these mergers, see Bergh, supra note 179, at 1-2; Richard Perez-Petla,
Time Warner Board Backs AOL Spinoff N.Y. TIMES, (May 28, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/business/media/29warner.html
[https://
perma.cc/2GUW-HRQB].

2020]

IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS

1987

even years later. 199 In contrast, as described above, antitrust
authorities have consistently declined to undo an anticompetitive merger mistakenly approved, even though they acknowledge-as have many scholars-that such mistakes have
occurred. 2 00 In other words, antitrust enforcers almost never
fix their prior mistakes by breaking up a company, but shareholders regularly fix their managers' mistakes by forcing a
breakup.
Administrative costs may be systematically higher in
forced divestitures, which are inherently adversarial. Higher
administrative costs would be expected, particularly if the parties frequently argue over details, requiring more court interventions and likely slowing the breakup down. These
differences are real, but some context for them is helpful.
Studies have found that private acquisitions are often subject
to litigation-by one estimate, over ninety percent.2 0 1 Thus,
private divestitures are subject to court delays. They also tend
to last years and take longer than executives expect. 2 0 2
The point here is not that private and public divestitures
involve the same costs. Ignoring for the moment the possibility
that higher antitrust breakup costs may be avoidable with effective regulatory design, 2 03 large-scale breakups will inevitably be complex, expensive, and lengthy. Rather, the point is
that the private sector perspective indicates that many antitrust observers may have inflated negative perceptions of the
administrative costs by attributing what is unavoidable-or at
least what also occurs in the private sector-to government
incompetence. The real question should be whether the inescapably high costs of the breakup are worth the benefits.
The current antitrust analysis may underestimate those
benefits. Some, if not most, breakups would be expected to
create non-antitrust-related value through the types of efficiency and nimbleness that motivate private sector divestitures. To elaborate, non-antitrust benefits may remain
unrealized due to factors such as agency costs, emotional bar199

See Donald D. Bergh & Barton M. Sharp, How Far Do Owners Reach into

the Divestiture Process? Blockholders and the Choice Between Spin-Off and SellOff, 41 J. MGMr. 1155, 1156 (2015).
200 See KWOKA, supra note 109; supra subpart I.A.
201 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IoWA L. REv. 465, 469 (2015).
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See, e.g., Stephen Heidari-Robinson & Suzanne Heywood, Getting Reorgs

Right, HARV. BuS. REv., Nov. 2016, at 84, 86 (reporting that eighty percent of

executives thought the deal did not achieve success on time); supra note 195 and
accompanying text (describing HP's lengthy divestiture).
203 See infra subpart IV.A (discussing breakup design).
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riers, or monopoly rents that outweigh the divestiture gains. 20 4
Independent of those considerations, however, any number of
current companies might benefit from divestitures without
those benefits being sufficient to justify the costs of the divestiture. If it would cost a company $500 million to implement a
private divestiture, and the efficiency and innovation gains of
the divestiture amount to $400 million, that company will not
rationally choose to divest. However, if the government were to
break up that company for independent antitrust reasons, the
(non-antitrust) $400 million in efficiency gains would need to
be added to the benefits side of the breakup-even though
those gains would not be the motivating factor.
Whether or not that $400 million would rightly be seen as
lowering the costs of a breakup's administration is debatable
but ultimately unimportant. In some contexts, those side benefits of breakups could offset even higher governmental costs of
administering breakups. More importantly, current antitrust
cost-benefit analysis could significantly underestimate the
benefits of breakups because it pays so little attention to the
gains illuminated by private sector divestitures.
Private sector divestitures also inform the high "failure"
rate of antitrust divestitures in the 1950s through 1970s that
tainted observers' assessments of the remedy. 2 05 By most accounts, a large portion of all M&A transactions have questionable value, with a representative study putting the failure rate at
almost half of all deals. 2 06 Scholars similarly conclude that
private sector divestitures have "mixed results."20 7
Of course, the different metrics do not allow straight comparisons of success rates across antitrust and the private sector.2 08 However, both large private and antitrust divestitures
are, at their core, about dividing a company into pieces. Thus,
private sector success rates can provide perspective on overlapping issues faced in antitrust breakups. For example, when
private divestiture failure rates are compared to evidence interpreted as proof that government breakups are costly, messy,
and potentially failing, it may suggest that legal scholars un204

These topics are developed further infra subparts III.B. and IV.B.
See supra subpart II.B.
See Nicole Zadrazil, Othmar Lehner & Heimo Losbichler, The Crucial Role
of Time in M&A Activities: An Inductive Exploration, 13 J. MOD. ACCT. & AUD=NG
350, 350-51 (2017) (reviewing the literature).
207 See Duhaime & Grant, supra note 191, at 313.
208 See supra section III.A.1. Thus, one cannot conclude from private divestiture rates that antitrust breakups should occur with a particular frequency or
success rate.
205
206

IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS

2020]

1989

fairly blamed unavoidable challenges on government incompetence. Business scholars who have described over seventy
percent of private sector deals as "abysmal failures" do not
recommend that executives abandon them. 2 0 9 Instead, they
view failures as opportunities to improve. 2 10
The business sector's persistence in the face of many failed
reorganizations has brought benefits in the case of divestitures. Studies have consistently concluded that divestitures
overall increase shareholder value. 2 1 1 The data also indicates
that certain types of divestitures add significantly more value,
particularly larger divestitures. 2 12 If intellectuals had convinced business leaders to abandon large private divestitures
based on the high failure rates evident in the 1980s, it would
have hurt the economy on a large scale. Yet around that time
intellectuals used flawed evidence of antitrust breakup failure
to convince authorities to abandon that remedy. Consequently, competition may have suffered due to that faulty evidentiary interpretation.
Although differences must be considered in comparing corporate divestitures to antitrust divestitures, such comparisons
should be made rather than ignored. Many important questions still remain unanswered in the business literature on
divestitures. 2 13 Still, the private divestiture literature is far
more expansive, recent, and rigorous than the corresponding
antitrust literature.
Situating antitrust remedies in the broader context of private sector reorganizations shows how the picture painted of
breakups has become distorted. The costs of breakups are not
as high as antitrust scholars and judges commonly assume.
Businesses regularly expend considerable funds on organizational streamlining and system updating. To estimate the accurate costs for an antitrust breakup, it would be necessary to
count only those expenses that would not have otherwise been
incurred. It would also be necessary to lower the estimated
"cost" of administering breakups by the gains from efficiency
and nimbleness, which are currently omitted from relevant antitrust remedy analyses.
209 See Roger L. Martin, M&A: The One Thing You Need to Get Right, HARV. Bus.
REV., June 2016, 42, 44 (providing M&A advice despite high failure rates).
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See, e.g., id. (recommending better oversight and skill transfer).
See Chris Veld & Yulia v. Veld-Merkoulova, Value Creation Through SpinOffs: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 11 INT'L J. MGMT. REVIEWS 407, 409
211

(2009).
212 See id.
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See Bergh, supra note 179 (reviewing the business literature).
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An isolated analysis also risks implying that complications
and delays are the fault of courts and enforcers, rather than
features of divestitures. Indeed, one of the factors driving some
CEOs to pursue a reorganization is the belief that the company
"needs to be shaken up." 2 14 Executives are even willing to
divide a company up along new lines that do not reflect a prior
merger.
That private sector mindset sits in stark contrast to the
widespread conception of antitrust breakups of consummated
mergers as "unscrambling the eggs." 2 15 Whereas nobody tries
to unscramble eggs, sophisticated and successful business
leaders routinely carve up their own integrated companies despite inevitable transaction costs and decades of evidence that
many fail. The hostility to breakups is partly born of the disciplinary and academic silo in which breakup conversations have
persisted.
B.

Shareholder Harm Is Not an Obstacle

The Supreme Court has historically emphasized that "the
Government cannot be denied the [divestiture] remedy because
economic hardship, however severe, may result." 2 16 Nonetheless, concerns about shareholders have persisted as a factor
influencing the remedy choice. 2 1 7 Indeed, in fighting the government's proposal of a breakup, Microsoft wanted the court to
consider "[tiestimony from Goldman, Sachs & Co. and from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter that dissolution would adversely
affect shareholder value." 2 18 The district court declined to do
so. However, in overturning the breakup order, the Court of
Appeals mentioned the value of hearing such testimony about
shareholder value. 2 19 The rest of this Part shows why significant shareholder harm is unlikely to happen and may be economically desirable if it does.
If the concern about shareholders comes from fear of harm
retirement and savings, the evolving structure of
people's
to
equity ownership is relevant. Most publicly traded shares of
See Heidari-Robinson & Heywood, supranote 202.
215 See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
216 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 327
(1961). Because it predates the Chicago School's ascendancy, this language does
not reflect today's Court.
217 See United States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 29-30 (D.
Conn. 1972), affd sub nom., Nader v. United States, 410 U.S. 919 (1973).
218 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
219 Id. at 98-99 (listing various sources of testimony that were improperly not
heard).
214
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large companies now are owned by mutual funds and other
institutional owners holding diverse stocks. As a result, the
impact of any given breakup would be diluted for most shareholders. Additionally, if a breakup improved long-term market
health-or immediately helped the monopoly's competitorsmost of a given monopoly's shareholders could benefit from a
breakup even if the broken-up company's stock was hurt. Indeed, one of the leading studies found that although the prosecuted company's stock went down, its rivals' stock went up. 2 2 0
Even if the concern is solely about an individual company's
shareholders, a breakup does not mean that a portion of the
company is eliminated. If Google is forced to sell YouTube or
Facebook is required to divest Instagram, shareholders would
receive a massive payment for that sale. 22 1 Overall, the literature consistently shows that private divestitures "have a positive impact on the divesting parent's share price." 2 2 2
There has been limited direct study of the effects on shareholders of breakups. Moreover, what few studies exist did not
examine the ultimate question of how breakups would compare
to other antitrust remedies. Nonetheless, the leading quantitative research into stock value following antitrust divestitures

suggests that the organizational reconfiguration does not sig-

nificantly drive the stock value down. 2 2 3
Nor have the most far-reaching antitrust breakups necessarily hurt shareholders. In its failed Supreme Court appeal of
dissolution, Standard Oil warned that dissolution would be
calamitous to shareholders-a possibility that could not be
ruled out with confidence at the time because such a case was
unprecedented. 2 2 4 But within a year of the court order to dissolve Standard Oil, the company's total stock value had increased. 2 2 5 Within two years of the court-ordered divestiture,
founder John D. Rockefeller's wealth tripled. 2 26 It is impossible
to know the counterfactual, but the breakup was not-as predicted by Standard Oil's lawyers-calamitous to shareholders.
220 Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu, supra note 166 (finding a transfer of monopoly
rents).

221

See Sharfman, supranote 44.

222 Moschieri & Mair, supra note 17, at 399.
223 See supra subpart II.B. (reviewing the literature).
224 See Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1301.
225 Malcolm R. Burns, The Competitive Effects of Trust-Busting: A Portfolio
Analysis, 85 J. POL. ECON. 717, 732 (1977).
226 See Michael Reksulak, William F. Shughart II, Robert D. Tollison, & Atin
Basuchoudhary, Titan Agonistes: The Wealth Effects of the Standard Oil (N. J.)
Case, 21 REs. L. & ECON. 63, 64 (2004).
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Of course, because historical antitrust breakups were
often poorly designed, more powerful antitrust divestitures
may lead to different results. If most scholars are correct that
2 2 7
that case
the AT&T breakup overall increased competition,
about
concern
government's
the
study is illustrative. Despite
2 28 AT&T shareholders benefitted subshareholder hardship,
stantially following the breakup. 2 2 9
How might breakups fail to harm shareholders even while
improving competition? Maintaining a monopoly can be expensive. 23 0 Instead of focusing on defensive protection of a dominant market position, firms in a competitive industry pursue
greater adaptability and innovation. 2 3 1 That renewal has the
potential to grow the industry at a faster rate than in an industry dominated by a monopolist. Faster-moving companies may
be even more important in light of the increasing pace with
232
which technologies are requiring companies to adapt.
Agency theory and organizational psychology help to explain this conundrum of effective antitrust breakups still increasing shareholder value. Senior managers have often
pursued growth, especially through mergers and acquisitions,
233
even when growth would not improve the company's value.
Yet many companies hold those acquisitions even after it is
clear that they were failures, only divesting them when forced
to do so by shareholders. 2 3 4 Agency theory helps explain how
these divestitures demonstrate a misalignment of incentives:
managers' compensation may depend on the size of the company, whereas owners care more about profit. 2 35 Or executives
may direct a large share of the monopoly rents toward salaries

227
228
229

Kovacic, supra note 59(describing scholars' perspectives).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Kovacic, supra note 59.
230 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 24, at 1188 ("Monopoly is not free money to
corporations-it has to be purchased.").
231
See Robert E. Hoskisson, Albert A. Cannella, Jr., Laszlo Tihanyi & Rosario
Faraci, Asset Restructuring and Business Group Affiliation in French Civil Law
Countries, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 525, 527, 532 (2004).
232 Cf. Eric D. Beinhocker, The Adaptable Corporation, MCKINSEY Q. 77, 82
(Apr. 2006) (describing how large companies "can sometimes become so complex
that they go into gridlock and change becomes impossible").
233
Cf. Jensen, supra note 177, at 61 (noting owner-manager conflicts).
234 See Jennifer E. Bethel & Julia Liebeskind, The Effects of Ownership Structure on CorporateRestructuring, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 15, 15 (1993).
235 Robert E. Hoskisson, Richard A. Johnson & Douglas D. Moesel, Corporate
Divestiture Intensity in Restructuring Firms: Effects of Governance, Strategy, and
Performance, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J.

1207, 1208-09 (1994).
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while the shareholders' portion does not offset the corresponding costs.236
Because the design of executive compensation structures
has improved, CEOs' motivation to grow counterproductively is
presumably lessened today compared to decades ago. 2 3 7 Moreover, increasing external pressures on managers-including
from activist shareholders 2 3 8 -have presumably made it more
likely managers will pursue value-creating divestitures. Nonetheless, the agency problem persists. 2 3 9 There is also some
evidence that organizational inertia and emotional factors may
cause companies to hold onto assets that they would economically benefit from divesting. 2 40
Another way of conceptualizing the potential benefits to
shareholders is to view antitrust breakups as a tool of corporate governance to push executives away from self-serving acquisitions. 24 1 A primary goal of corporate law is to align the
incentives of shareholders and managers by, for instance, imposing a fiduciary duty on managers. 2 4 2 Yet it is costly for
shareholders to monitor and influence their agents in the
firm-managers and directors-which helps explain why "[t]he
problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law."243 By discouraging managers from pursuing
growth that harms shareholders, or by encouraging beneficial
divestitures, antitrust enforcers may benefit shareholders by
addressing some harmful effects of high agency costs.
It is unclear what percentage of breakups would add value
to shareholders by solving agency costs or otherwise improving
the firm's performance. But recent empirical evidence indicates that when CEOs propose mergers, "there is a very large
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understandingand Evaluating
Performance-Based Executive Pay 8 (Bos. Univ. Sch. Law, Law & Economics
Working Paper No. 15-34, 2015) (describing how an upsurge in relative performance evaluation in executive pay arrangements focuses compensation on firmspecific performance).
238 On activists and management, see Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity's
236
237

GovernanceAdvantage: A Requiem, 99 B.U. L. REv. 1095, 1097 (2019).
239 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
InstitutionalInvestors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 90 (2017).
240 See Bergh, supra note 179 (reviewing the literature).
241 See Spencer Weber Waller, CorporateGovernance and Competition Policy,
18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 833, 873-74 (2011) (discussing the relationship between

antitrust and shareholder value).
242 See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Officer Accountability, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
357, 360-63 (2016).
243 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, PrincipalCosts: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLuM. L. REv. 767, 767 (2017).
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2 4 4
thumb on the scale that pushes all deals toward approval."
It is plausible that a substantial portion of antitrust breakups
would not harm shareholders, and many may even benefit
them. Of course, it is not, and should not be, the goal of antitrust to break up a company to bring shareholders unrealized
gains. Still, the evidence available suggests that any resistance
to breakups out of concern for significant harm to shareholders
rests on weak foundations.
Despite the absence of evidence of extreme harm to shareholders in the past, to the extent that a monopoly is earning
considerable profits from its market dominance, lower stock
value would be expected following at least some effective breakups. Putting aside for now the questions surrounding deterrence and fairness, 2 45 what does the private sector literature on
divestitures add to this issue?
As the primary tool for assessing corporate law and antitrust, efficiency would presumably weigh heavily in the com2 46
parison of shareholder interests to consumer welfare.
Antitrust laws arguably already prioritize consumer welfare
2 4 7 To that preexisting
over the monopoly owners' interests.
hierarchy, this Article has illuminated another efficiency contributor omitted from those analyses: Breakups can help ensure that managers only retain "assets for which [their firms]
have a comparative advantage and sell assets as soon as an2 4 8 That addiother party can manage them more efficiently."
tional efficiency consideration further weakens the argument
for letting shareholder harm obstruct breakups.
In summary, substantial valuation drops as a result of
breakups are uncertain to happen and of little societal concern
if they do. Indeed, as the next subpart shows, even if every
future breakup harms monopolies' shareholders that result
may be desirable for addressing monopolies.

244 James D. Cox, Tomas J. Mondino & Randall S. Thomas, Understandingthe
(Ir)relevanceof ShareholderVotes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. 503, 504 (2019).
245 Deterrence is discussed infra in subpart III.C. Those hit hardest would be
concentrated shareholders, such as executives and founders of a given large firm,
many of whom would have directly benefited from the antitrust violations or have
the ability to monitor anticompetitive wrongdoing. Thus, disgorgement of their
prior anticompetitive profits would be appropriate to better align incentives and
beneficial from a fairness perspective.
246 See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in CorporateLaw: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 637-39 (2006).
247 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Casefor ConsumerPrimacy in Corporate Governance, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 1395, 1400 (2020).
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Costly Breakups May Increase Deterrence

The discussion so far has questioned whether breakup
costs are prohibitively high, especially viewed through the private sector lens on such costs. But the argument has yet to
examine the predominant assumption in the literature that
high breakup costs are unequivocally bad. 2 4 9 Upon closer examination, that assumption is incomplete.
Of course, holding all else equal, it is desirable to expend
fewer public resources and seek minimal waste to achieve the
same antitrust goal. Nonetheless, to be effective, antitrust
remedies must prevent companies from seeking to abuse monopoly power in the future. 2 5 0 As mentioned above, however,
the existing empirical critiques that labeled breakups a failure
did not consider deterrence. 25 ' In other words, the indictment
of breakups is uninformed by what is arguably the field's main
function, because "U.S. antitrust policy is primarily a deterrence system." 25 2
One reason for that omission is that the difficulty in measuring deterrence makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions. 25 3 However, breakups must play a central role in the
architecture of antitrust. Unlike in Europe, where "the civil
fine is the tool of choice," 2 54 U.S. "antitrust laws do not now
provide for a 'civil penalty' for monopolization." 2 5 5 Nor do antitrust enforcers exercise their ability to pursue disgorgement,
which requires a monopoly firm to forfeit its illegal profits. 25 6
The costs imposed by a breakup are thus a potential substitute
for the deterrent effects of disgorgement and civil penalties. 25 7
249

See supra subpart I.B. (reviewing the hostility to breakups).

250 George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws. 9 J.L. & ECON.
225, 227 (1966).
251 See supra subpart II.B. Nor do leading examinations of antitrust deter-

rence necessarily consider breakups of existing monopolies.
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252 Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 98 (2002).
253 Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, Settle for Now
but Block for Tomorrow: The DeterrenceEffects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 J.L.
ECON. 607, 608 (2009).
254 Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust

Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 567, 570 (2006).
255
Harry First, The Casefor Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76

ANTITRUST

L.J. 127,

127 (2009).
256
See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgementas an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTnrRUST L.J.

79, 79 (2009). Private parties could bring follow-on lawsuits for damages, if
judges allow. See John M. Newman, The Antitrust Jurisprudenceof Neil Gorsuch,
45 FiA. ST. U. L. REv. 225, 242-48 (2017).

257 The substitute has the disadvantage of not being well calibrated in terms of
the total amount and ability to affect executives personally.
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If remedies were only pursued when they imposed minimal
burdens on companies, then there would be few downsides for
companies pursuing anticompetitive mergers: in the worst case
scenario they still gain because they keep the monopoly profits
earned prior to the low-cost breakup. 25 8
The current breakup paradigm also gives businesses a
blueprint for strategically positioning themselves to avoid
breakups. Scholars and courts have emphasized that although
it is relatively easy to split a company up when it has merged
but kept its operations separate, it would be unwise to break
9
up those same companies once integrated. 25 In 2012, an FTC
Bureau of Competition director clarified in an official statement
that the agency "is most likely to ... divest an autonomous, ongoing business unit that comprises at least one party's entire
business in the relevant market." 26 0 That policy seeks to ensure that the divested "business unit contains all components
necessary to operate autonomously, that it has operated autonomously, that it is segregable from the parent, and that the
unit's buyer will be able to maintain or restore competition
almost immediately." 2 6 1
Courts have offered related details for merging companies
wishing to avoid a later breakup. If a business that merged
illegally has been together for some length of time, the court
will look at investments made after the merger that may be
diminished by a breakup. In the case of two hospitals that
merged seven years earlier in violation of antitrust law, for
instance, the FTC found divestiture too costly because the
combined company had invested in improvements to a cardiac
surgery program and computer systems. 26 2 A divestiture could
cause delays in the surgery program and glitches in the computer systems. 2 6 3
The implication from these guidance statements and court
orders is that executives running a monopoly-whether built
organically or through illicit mergers-can improve their
chances of avoiding being broken up by integrating all business
258 Cf. Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policyfor Optimal
Deterrenceand Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2647, 2652 (2013) (applying decision theory to merger review).
259 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
RICHARD FEINSTEIN, FED. TRADE COMM'N, NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDIES:
260
STATEMENT OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 5

(2012), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/negotiating-merger-remedies/merger-remediesstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLT4-CZBJ].
261
Id.
262
263

Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 375, 449 (F.T.C. 2007).
Id. at 522.
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units. The current framework incentivizes executives to make
rapid investments, such as in common technological interfaces
that link different parts of the company and ensure that no
significant piece operates autonomously.
Anecdotal evidence points to such strategic positioning. In
2018, after a wave of calls to break up Facebook took particular
aim at its acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp, 26 4 CEO
Mark Zuckerberg announced plans to connect these platforms
more closely. 26 5 More generally, executives dislike breakups
and often take steps to grow their companies even when it is
unprofitable to do sO. 2 6 6 This aversion to breakups suggests
that business leaders would take steps to prevent breakups.
Thus, there is reason to believe that companies strategically take steps post-merger to lessen the likelihood of authorities breaking them up in the future. 26 7 Such maneuvering may
help explain the dearth of breakups, particularly if savvy businesses are able to integrate more quickly than antitrust authorities can learn that a merger was anticompetitive.
Although other reasons to integrate exist, excess integration
motivated by breakup avoidance is wasteful. Excess integration is thus doubly harmful, through both short-term higher
costs and long-term thwarting of antitrust. Yet these skewed
incentives are omitted from the recent literature on
breakups. 26 8
Additionally, it is difficult, if not impossible, for executives
to rigorously identify harms to the company caused by excess
integration, such as making the business "too big to manage." 26 9 While identifying the more concrete potential benefits
of avoiding a breakup and costly reorganization is easier, the
indeterminacy of estimating breakup effects makes it impossible to know whether antitrust currently over-deters or underdeters. 2 70 There is a risk of over-deterring, which could prevent
264
See, e.g., John Micklethwait, Margaret Talev & Jennifer Jacobs, Trump
Says Google, Facebook, Amazon May Be Antitrust Situation', BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30,
2018, 9:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/
google-under-fire-again-on-search-as-hatch-calls-for-ftc-probe
[https://
perma.cc/SA2Y-AEBM].
265 BBC, supra note 188.
266 See supra note 233.
267 For an application of decision theory to antitrust remedies, see Salop,
supra note 258.
268 See, e.g., Patel, supranote 8, at 44 (expressing only the opposite concern of
disincentivizing prompt or complete integration for fear of the costs of a
mandatory breakup).
269
Cf Kress, supra note 182, at 195-200, 203 (discussing the managerial
problems caused by size in several major financial firms).

270

See Calkins, supranote 254, at 568 & n.4; Salop, supra note 258, at 2649.
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some beneficial mergers or investment in innovation. However,
the weight of the evidence suggests that antitrust enforcers
have been more likely to err on the side of underenforcement. 2 7 1 This Article's demonstration of the underappreciated
analytic and institutional resistance to breakups strengthens
the case for concluding that the current antitrust framework
under-deters. 2 7 2
In the extreme, in theory costly breakups could be preferable to low-cost breakups if the benefits of improving deterrence
outweigh the administrative waste. From a more realistic perspective, the implication is that the unavoidable costs of breakups can provide societal benefits by discouraging
anticompetitive mergers and inefficient integration. To be
clear, enforcers should not purposefully make breakups extra
costly. 2 7 3 But understood as a byproduct of improving firmlevel efficiency, deterrence, and competition, substantial
breakup administration costs can contribute to an optimal antitrust policy.
IV
IMPLICATIONS

The statutory root of antitrust authority, the Sherman Act,
did not specify divestiture as a remedy. 2 7 4 Instead, that authority flows from courts' equity powers, and "is flexible and
capable of nice 'adjustment and reconciliation between the
public interest and private needs as well as between competing
private claims.'" 2 75 As a result, a shift toward viewing breakups as administrable can immediately improve antitrust without changing statutes or upending doctrine. Breakup
administration also speaks to possible legislative reforms to
antitrust that could better address monopolies.
A.

Administering Breakups

In assessing breakups as a remedy, the question is how the
government might perform today rather than how it performed
decades ago. The literature on private sector breakups emphasizes that divestitures' success varies depending on the design
271
272
cock,
273
274

See KWOKA, supra note 109; Shapiro, supra note 22.
On the broader topic of deterrence inconsistencies, see Ramsi A. WoodInconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REv. 105, 159 (2013).

A monetary penalty would be preferable for adding deterrence to breakups.
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-38).
275 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 131 (1969)
(quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)).

2020)

IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS

1999

and management of the process. 2 76 Three principles are important for designing the administration of antitrust breakups:
leveraging business sector expertise, streamlining court involvement, and remaining open to large breakups.
The first of these principles, business expertise, is important in light of perhaps the primary source of resistance to
breakups: "Judges aren't good at breaking up companies." 2 7 7
Observers are right to doubt courts' competence in administering such day-to-day business decisions. However, that critique
of breakups reflects an antiquated understanding of

governance.

'

Since the last large-scale breakup, many agencies have
evolved toward what scholars have described as "new governance" and "collaborative" methods of regulation. 2 78 These and
related concepts speak to regulatory process design and are
most closely associated among legal scholars with administrative law. 2 79 In the context of breakup administration, this
model of governance would encourage the regulator to leverage
private-sector expertise and knowledge rather than recreating
it.2 8 0 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and other agencies now
pervasively rely on large businesses to develop internal selfregulatory processes, often through a compliance department
or third-party inspectors. The agencies then monitor or manage the firm's internal self-policing infrastructure. 2 8
These new governance models allow the agency to benefit
from the firm's skill in designing the best path to achieving a
regulatory goal. 2 8 2 A key design feature is establishing a regular dialogue with regulated entities, in which the regulator
learns about and assesses the process and outputs. 2 8 3 Viewed
through this more expansive new governance lens, the government's competence in designing and managing breakups
276 Christian Thywissen, Ulrich Pidun & Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufsep, Process
Matters-The Relevance of the Decision Making Processfor Divestiture Outcomes,
51 LONG RANGE PLANNING 267, 278-79 (2018).
277

Spangler, supra note 6.

278
279
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543, 549 (2000).
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See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: MonitoringBusinesses in
an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1603-04 (2019).
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should not be the determinative factor in assessing whether
breakups are administrable.
By some measures, the FTC has been slower than other
agencies in shifting toward new governance. For instance,
whereas the CFPB and EPA have about as many lawyers as
monitors (which are called examiners or inspectors), the FTC
enforces the law almost entirely through lawyers. 2 84 However,
the FTC appears open to relying on private parties, such as
independent third-partymonitors in divestitures. 28 5 Assuming
a large gap exists between the FTC's tactics and regulatory best
practices, the differences should lend further confidence that
improvements in its historic approach to breakups are possible
by moving closer to administrative best practices.
How would these principles translate into administering
breakups? Space constraints do not allow for a comprehensive
sketch of the process, but the literature in finance, strategy
management, and business organization provides insights into
how to administer breakups more effectively. Success factors
include involving middle managers in implementation 28 6 and
adopting an effective communication campaign with

employees.287
Antitrust enforcers should not be expected to become experts on these various details, although hiring industry divestiture experts as antitrust agency employees would help.
Enforcers can to some extent leverage the monopoly's internal
reorganization capabilities, but relying on a self-serving firm's
workforce as the main source of business expertise would be a
mistake. Thus, enforcers can increase the chances that the
breakup benefits consumers by requiring the firm to pay for
outside reorganization experts.
Hiring outside experts to run the breakup is essential because research into private, voluntary divestitures supports
the commonsense notion that "serial divesters," or firms that
regularly divest, perform far better at divestitures. 28 8 Yet the
dearth of large-scale antitrust breakups means that antitrust
enforcers lack such experience, including the ability to identify
284
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what key information the firm may be hiding that is crucial to a
successful divestiture.2 89 Nor are monopolies themselves likely
to be serial divesters even if their advice could be trusted. Hiring outside experts brings serial divestiture expertise into the
process because those entities have experience in designing
effective reorganizations and knowing what information they
must request from a firm to make effective decisions.
An inevitable challenge is that reorganization experts specialize in adding value to the firm rather than promoting competition. Again, the literature on new governance proves
instructive. To some extent, a similar argument could be made
about other industries-that firms specialize in making profits,
not in enforcing the law-so why situate compliance within the
firm? Part of the answer is that the goal is to build on as much
private sector expertise as possible before adding the public
regulatory layer. Another way of thinking about this is that a
reorganization is difficult enough; whether the third-party consultants can help with 10 percent or 90 percent of the process,
leveraging business knowledge is better than ignoring it.
Moreover, the enforcer and trustee would still be involved
in managing the plan's design in an iterative process. There
would thus ideally be a team component to the breakup administration process that weighs various options from both perspectives. The enforcer brings the deeper understanding of
what would improve competition that the private sector consultants may lack.
That reporting structure speaks to a related concern. The
close working relationship with the monopoly in developing the
breakup plan risks industry capture of the process. A captured
third-party expert or regulator could encourage breakups that
place excess weight on increasing the value of the firm. To
address that risk, the monopoly should be required to pay for
the third-party experts, but not be allowed to choose them-or
at least it should not have the final word. Moreover, the thirdparty experts should agree not to serve the firms involved in the
divestiture for a certain number of years afterwards to avoid
conflicts of interest. Additionally, it would reduce capture potential that the consultant would report to and need to have its
breakup plan approved by the FTC, DOJ, or other government
representative. These and other adjustments would need to be
implemented into the design of breakup administration to ad-
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dress the unavoidable challenges in such a large-scale publicprivate undertaking.
Although third-party reorganization services can cost millions of dollars, firms often hire such experts when they voluntarily merge and reorganize. 2 90 Regardless, imposing
additional expenses alongside the breakup could help fill the
gap of civil penalties in addressing monopolies, thereby making
divestitures more deterrent. 2 9 1 The purpose is not to increase
the breakup's costs, but the deterrence upside potentially
makes such administration-improving costs more acceptable.
To some, a privatized breakup process will seem suboptimal. Whether it would be preferable for administrative agencies to have the capabilities to design and oversee the day-today details of breakups is debatable. Similarly, judges would
benefit from having the resources and competence to swiftly
rule on objections from the monopolist along the way. But that
world does not exist and creating it would require massive
government overhauls and increases in public expenditures.
The more relevant question is whether the addition of
third-party reorganization expertise-which can be implemented without doctrinal, organizational, or expenditure
changes-is a substantial improvement over breakups run by
government authorities with limited expertise and resources.
More generally, to reject breakups based on either an assumption that the government must do everything or a mistrust of
collaborative governance would be to hold antitrust to a different standard than other regulators face. 2 9 2
The second principle is to streamline the court's involvement in designing and implementing the breakup as much as
possible. Avoiding protracted legal wrangling about the details
is important because one of the biggest administrability critiques of breakups is excess delay. 2 9 3 A similar problem has
motivated new governance models that aim to move from an
adversarial to a cooperative relationship. 2 9 4 Rather than the
agency and firm fighting through court orders to hand over
290
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information, the goal is a problem-solving approach in which
the firm and the regulator work together towards a common
compliance goal. 2 95
Both the regulator's authority and its approach are relevant when it seeks to avoid repeatedly going to court over many
details of the breakup. Of course, the monopoly should have a
means of weighing in on and submitting evidence about the
choice of remedy and the shape of the breakup. At the same
time, courts should exercise their discretion to avoid what
Microsoft had requested: "substantial discovery, adequate time
for preparation and a full trial on relief." 2 96 When courts grant
such broad requests by deep-pocketed companies, they greatly
increase the costs of pursuing a breakup. The monopoly thus
succeeds in making that particular case more difficult for resource-strapped enforcers and in weakening the intellectual
argument for breakups by providing yet another example of a
bogged down, expensive case.
Although many approaches might streamline court involvement, a straightforward path would be to return to the
long-established tendency to defer to the enforcers' remedy design. 2 9 7 That approach makes more sense in light of what Rebecca Haw Allensworth has identified as the "adversarial
economics" problem in antitrust, in which courts struggle to
determine the winner of the "battle of the experts" hired by
each party.298 One of Allensworth's solutions is to provide
courts with access to third-party expert testimony. 2 9 9 Another
way of conceptualizing the hiring of third-party reorganization
experts is as addressing this dueling economists problem, but
outside of the delay-filled court process.
To further improve expediency and expertise, the court
should also delegate considerable process administration to a
court-appointed trustee, ideally one with deep antitrust and
private sector divestiture experience. In recent years, courts
have increasingly relied on these parties-sometimes called a
295
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special master or monitor-to oversee antitrust remedies. 3 0 0
The trustee has unrestricted access to the monopoly and communicates to the DOJ or FTC any anticompetitive conduct observed. 3 0 1 These court-appointed monitors have in many fields
become a standard means to "police the firm" following court
orders. 30 2
The regulatory structure for breakups would thus be best
understood as the trustee running the day-to-day process,
subject to veto by the antitrust enforcer. The trustee and enforcer would oversee a private sector workforce of third-party
reorganization experts paid for by the monopoly, in addition to
the monopoly's internal experts who inform the breakup plan.
Courts would provide a check on the process but should only
become involved in unusual circumstances once the breakup
process is underway, with heavy deference to the enforcer and
trustee-run plan. Perhaps court involvement would be mostly
limited to situations in which the enforcer disagreed with the
trustee, or some high bar such as abuse of discretion. Those
limits are important to ensure that the breakup process stays
streamlined.
A third principle for effective administration is removing
the government inhibition about pursuing far-reaching breakups. One of the most consistent findings in the empirical literatures on both private and antitrust divestitures is that smaller
divestitures leave the separated assets with insufficient resources to compete. 30 3 Additionally, smaller divestitures may
leave the monopoly too large and fail to produce a sufficiently
fragmented industry. 3 0 4
Antitrust authorities appear to have internalized some of
those lessons in the past few years. Aside from speeches proclaiming as much, 3 0 5 enforcers in 2018 required the largest
300
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divestiture ever, a $9 billion divestiture as a condition for approving the Bayer/Monsanto merger, and negotiated another
sizeable divestiture to DISH as part of the Sprint/T-Mobile
deal. 3 0 6 Granted, those large merger-approval divestitures are
few and amount to a fraction of the size of what the sale of
Instagram would be. 3 0 7 Thus, those deals are of limited relevance to the debates about breaking up some of today's largest
companies. Nonetheless, the trend toward larger pre-merger
divestitures indicates that antitrust enforcers may recognize
the benefits to competition of larger divestitures.
Ironically, the reluctance since the 1980s to push for large
breakups stems in part from a fear of messing something
up. 30 8 But by holding back out of fear of mistakes, enforcers
make it less probable that those divestitures will succeed as
ongoing businesses. Rather than avoiding damage, the antitrust Hippocratic Oath can sometimes cause harm.3 0 9 Courts
and enforcers must be willing not only to pursue breakups, but
also to design them to fully address the problem-by analogy,
to remove the entire cancerous tumor rather than only part of
it.

This discussion is not meant to provide an exhaustive list
of administrative best practices. For instance, it would also be
ideal to consider accompanying breakups with penalties, to the
extent that the costs of a breakup are deemed insufficient for
optimal deterrence. Nor should the discussion be taken as
suggesting that antitrust breakups as described here would be
a straightforward undertaking. Like any private reorganization
and any government intervention in private affairs, they would
often prove messy and imperfect.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the historical approach
to administering breakups can be meaningfully improved
upon-a process that has already begun. Moreover, as antitrust enforcers gain experience administering breakups, they
will become better process supervisors. 3 1 0 In addition to lever306 Recent Proposed Judgment, DOJApproves T-Mobile/Spring Merger Under
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&

Telekom AG, No. 19-cv-02232 (D.D.C. July 26, 2019), 133 HARV. L. REV. 739, 741
(2019); Arthur J. Burke, Ronan P. Harty, Jon Leibowitz, Howard Shelanski

Jesse Solomon, Davis Polk Discusses Largest U.S. Antitrust Divestiture in BayerMonsanto Deal, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 13, 2018), https://clsbuesky.
law.columbia.edu/2018/06/13/davis-polk-discusses-largest-u-s-antitrustdivestiture-in-bayer-monsanto-deal/ [https://perma.cc/33HY-YUH7].
307 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
308 See supra subpart I.B (explaining the origins of hostility to breakups).
309 On the Hippocratic Oath, see Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 57, at 2.
310 Cf. Humphery-Jenner, Powell & Zhang, supra note 288.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

2006

[Vol. 105:1955

aging existing private sector experience, regulators should
adopt the prevailing corporate mindset of recognizing glitches
as parts of a worthwhile process. Unavoidable setbacks provide opportunities to improve administration rather than reason to abandon a remedy that is well within modern
collaborative regulators' sphere of competence.
B.

Choosing Breakups

This Article's main implication concerns enforcers' and
courts' perception of breakups. The predominant discomfort
with breakups as a remedy is rooted in two misperceptions.
The first is that the government is disastrous at administering
breakups. The second is that the risks of a breakup are tremendous. Neither of these is supported in the literature, particularly once breakups are viewed in terms of how they would
and should be administered today, rather than how they were
implemented decades ago.
As a result, at the very least, there is a need for greater
openness to deploying breakups. As part of this increased
openness, courts should view with great skepticism dire predictions that breakups will destroy shareholder value, consumer welfare, the industry, or the economy. Faced with a
government breakup, businesses have historically developed
self-serving estimates that later proved to be wrong. 3 1 1
The question then becomes how much more than openness
is warranted. Is there support for a regulatory or judicial default assumption that breakups are the superior remedy?
Once a firm has violated antitrust law, choosing a remedy
amounts to a prediction of whether breakups would be superior to alternatives.
1.

ComparingBreakups to Access Remedies

This section focuses on mandated access, an alternative
remedy in the post-merger context. However, much of the
analysis is relevant to other behavioral remedies and to other
liability contexts. The focus on access mandates reflects their
prevalence in recent breakup conversations as the leading alternative suggested instead of breakups. Some critiques of
AT&T's dissolution emphasize that a better solution would
have been to mandate that AT&T allow competitors to use its
311

See supra subpart II.A.

2020]

IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS

2007

telephone network. 3 12 Also, instead of splitting Instagram from
Facebook, one of the prominent proposed alternative remedies
is to require "that Facebook enable open interconnection between itself and any new market entrant." 3 13 The preference by
many for this alternative is rooted in a skepticism about breakups' administrability, even in the post-merger context. 3 14 Additionally, access remedies are more appealing than other
behavioral remedies in the post-merger context because there
may be no conduct to prohibit moving forward that would address the prior merger.
Comparing access remedies to breakups is a context-specific undertaking, and thus attempting to declare one remedy
as superior to the other overall would be of limited value. Access remedies have the potential to improve consumer welfare,
particularly in the context of financial and technology platforms or when a breakup would destroy what consumers value
most in a company. 3 1 5 Moreover, breakups and access remedies together will sometimes be necessary. 3 1 6
It would nonetheless be a mistake to view breakups as
inherently more costly and messy than access remedies simply
because two merged companies have integrated. Scholars have
pointed out that access remedies require ongoing "sophisticated oversight and dispute resolution mechanisms that typically exceed the resources and strengths of the enforcement
agencies." 3 17 Although the perception of bad experiences with
breakups soured antitrust decision makers, "our experience
with conduct remedies has also not been satisfying, and there
is little reason to think that such decrees work any better in
monopolization cases." 3 18 In the most recent large-scale case
312
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that included access remedies, Microsoft was involved with the
court for sixteen years, until 2011.319 Thus, a similar narrative
of administrative messiness can be crafted about access remedies as exists for breakups.
Moreover, given the outdated antitrust view of breakups,
many observers may have compared access remedies implemented recently with breakups administered decades ago. A
more rigorous comparison would reflect how enforcers would
administer breakups today-by leveraging private sector expertise. 3 2 0 Within that proper frame of reference, there is no
strong evidentiary basis that access remedies are more
administrable.
Nor do those arguments in favor of access remedies consider the types of economic gains identified in this Article for
breakups. The antitrust analysis sees the benefits of intervention in terms of consumer welfare and the remedies as part of
the costs. However, to those consumer welfare benefits, breakups as a remedy add the extraneous societal gains of nimbler,
more efficient firms. 3 2 1 Included in those overlooked benefits
are the reorganization and systems upgrade expenses that can
be handled during the breakup and that even a well-run monopoly would have undertaken anyways. 3 22 Access remedies,
and indeed behavioral remedies overall, do not provide those
additional benefits. For large monopolies, breakups' added efficiency could be substantial.
These additional considerations may be enough to tip the
remedy scale in breakups' favor in many cases. But given the
dearth of recent data points available, the empirical case for a
breakup preference is weak. The safe stance would therefore
be to declare that the remedy analysis should be undertaken
from a place of neutrality. A neutral starting point defers the
choice of remedy to future sophisticated cost-benefit analyses
tailored to the facts of a given case.
There are risks in adopting a facially neutral approach,
however. Neutrality towards remedies would be ideal if the
remedy analysis were truly objective, informed by the interdisciplinary empirics relevant to breakups, and able to adjust for
deterrence. However, arguably the primary "dilemma facing
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 338 (D.D.C. 1995);
319
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antitrust enforcers is to balance the costs and benefits in a
world without perfect information." 3 2 3 In all likelihood, faced
with the monopoly's sophisticated economic argument against
breakups, in many cases the government's economists will fail
to establish any particular remedy as definitively preferable. 3 2 4
As a result, despite the intention to remain objective, the
decision will still often come down to a judgment call. Behavioral economics has shown that unrecognized biases influence
even experts' decisions. 3 25 Institutions and ideologies resist
change, and even what people conclude from scientific experiments depends partly on what their preconceptions have
taught them to see. 3 26 Moreover, wealthy firms exert considerable influence on the political process and consistently argue
against breakups. 3 2 7 The most influential actors in the private
sector would thus overall be expected to steer antitrust policy
away from breakups. Of course, officials may still choose
breakups under intense public or political pressure, such as
that surrounding their ongoing investigations of Amazon,
Facebook, and Google. 3 28 But in the absence of such extraordinary influence, the psychologically and politically attractive choice for an unsure enforcer may be to settle for a
remedy other than a breakup. A purportedly neutral approach
risks amounting to a de facto preference for remedies other
than breakups.329
Is a de facto default to behavioral remedies desirable? In
theory, a behavioral remedy default allows for lighter antitrust
intervention. A preference for behavioral remedies is thus appropriate when there is concern about over-enforcement or
over-deterrence. However, if scholars are correct that antitrust
faces the opposite problem, there are institutional design foundations for a default to breakups.
323
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Additionally, more ex post breakups can improve ex ante
identification of harmful mergers. Because firms proposing a
merger have far more extensive information than do antitrust
authorities, they are in a better position to predict whether a
given merger will later prove anticompetitive. By pursuing the
remedy that firms dislike the most, ex post breakups can cause
firms to internalize the costs of anticompetitive mergers. Holding enforcers' merger approval process constant, 3 3 0 an increase
in ex post breakups would therefore overall add more of the
private sector's sophistication to determining which mergers
3 31
should not move forward due to anticompetitive concerns.
The potential to better calibrate antitrust diagnostics supports
a breakup default.
Institutional design considerations also apply when administering the remedy. Even with a flawless design, access
mandates usually require ongoing oversight. Consequently,
executives can retain their monopoly power if they can sufficiently outmaneuver regulatory monitoring. More broadly,
there are many different ways to abuse monopoly power. As a
result, beyond policing a firm for a specific behavioral remedy,
the government must have mechanisms for policing that same
firm for different violations.
A breakup that addresses monopoly power, rather than
leaving it intact, offers the greatest potential to avoid both of

those ongoing sources of regulatory oversight. The private sector has greater resources and sophistication than antitrust authorities, whose budgets have not grown-or have shrunk332
even as the markets they regulate expanded considerably.
Access remedies requiring enduring government involvement
are therefore more in tension with agencies' resource and sophistication limitations than are breakups, which offer a clear
end point. 3 3 3
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Another institutional limitation on antitrust authorities is
that their leadership is subject to sudden changes in the political process when new presidential administrations arrive.
Consequently, a monopoly subject to behavioral constraints
could wait for a more deregulatory political regime to assume
control of antitrust enforcement, at which point the monopolist
could petition for lax monitoring or fewer restraints. 3 34 Relatedly, the monopoly's efforts to capture enforcers are more constant than public attention. That asymmetry in pressure and
the subtle nature of regulatory monitoring make access mandates vulnerable to erosion.
Breakups are inherently more resistant to the political process.3 3 5 Granted, the changing of presidential administrations
complicated the government's decision not to continue pursuing a breakup of Microsoft following the appeal.3 3 6 Still, once a
breakup is executed a future pro-monopoly FTC, for instance,
cannot simply reconstruct the prior monopoly. Thus, breakups may be more likely to succeed because they require less
monitoring by both the enforcer and the public.
Finally, breakups are the more market-oriented remedy.
Those arguing for inaction or the continuation of more cautious
antitrust enforcement often reason that dynamic competition
will ultimately unseat even monopolies. 3 3 7 That view weighs in
favor of conduct over structural remedies, because markets
have the chance to respond to inevitable imperfections in the
breakup administration. In contrast, with access remedies,
private actors face a sustained non-market constraint. Those
putting faith in markets, and dynamic competition, should
thus find that mandated breakups driven by the private sector
are the more appealing antitrust remedy.
The case for a breakup default is strongest in the case of
consummated mergers. It may thus be worth shifting the burden of proof onto the party arguing against breakups in the
post-merger context. Moreover, as Steven Salop has argued,
334
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antitrust authorities should consider requiring divestitures of
the company even if the divested pieces are unrelated to the
original anticompetitive merger.3 3 8 That principle is crucial in
the context of a monopoly's acquisition of a nascent competitor, which may have halted the competitor during the sole window of time comprising any true threat. 3 3 9
Should breakups be the default remedy beyond the postmerger context? Although a universal antitrust breakup default for non-merger cases is unwarranted, the traditional deference to enforcers' choice of remedy seems sensible-even if
the remedy is a breakup. In choosing a remedy, however, enforcers should consider the factors mentioned above-the challenges of policing monopolies for behavioral remedies, need for
deterrence, and broader economic benefits of breakups. Enforcers and judges should then make the final decision based
on what would most help consumers and society rather than
which remedy most closely fits the wrong.
2.

Comparing Breakups to Inaction and Other
Alternatives

Space constraints do not allow for devoting similar attention to comparing other alternatives, but a few brief notes are
in order. Other alternatives include financial penalties, regulation outside of antitrust, and inaction. Financial penalties are
difficult and impractical to set at a deterrent level. 3 4 0 These
and other alternatives are worthy of sustained examination,
and in some contexts one or several of them combined may be
superior to breakups. However, overall, conduct prohibitions
and penalties are less promising than other remedies for addressing the full costs of the anticompetitive merger.
In terms of regulatory interventions outside of antitrust,
new legal rules would be needed for many such proposals for
338
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oversight, such as treating online platforms as utilities. 3 4 1
Thus, those outside-of-antitrust alternatives may not be practical-making the real choice between an antitrust remedy and
no intervention.
If breakups cannot be used once a company has integrated, for some the best option would be inaction. There is
little doubt that preventing anticompetitive mergers beforehand is better than prosecuting them afterwards. Moreover,
the lowest-cost intervention-narrowly defined as the expenditures by government-will always be to do nothing and hope
that markets will dislodge the monopoly, such as through disruptive innovation. 3 4 2 Also, it is hard to argue with the proposition that, all else equal, antitrust should promote
competition through the intervention with the least administrative costs.
However, it is difficult to identify all anticompetitive mergers in advance. 34 3 Additionally, if the-goal is to address monopoly power, we cannot be assured that an organic market
disruption is around the corner. An extreme faith in markets
to solve all problems has become far less common than it was
during formative years in antitrust development. 3 4 4 Since
then, Nobel Prize-winning work in transaction costs, behavioral
economics, and information asymmetries has laid the foundations for seeing that market failures are widespread and
persistent. 34 5
Moreover, the economic goal is not to lower the expenses
incurred by the government and the monopoly in implementing
the remedy. Instead, it is to advance competitive markets that
improve consumer welfare-measured, in great part, by efficiency. 34 6 To be sure, an efficiency analysis should include the
341 See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: PrivatePower, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REv. 1621, 1670
(2018).
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remedy implementation expenses. But there is no strong evidence that antitrust breakups harm efficiency. 3 4 7 Therefore,
the remedy that costs the least to implement-inaction-can
be by far the most economically harmful choice if it leaves in
place a monopolist that substantially lowers consumer welfare
or provides incentives for anticompetitive mergers.
Defaulting to breakups would leave open the possibility of
convincing evidence swaying the remedy choice in another direction, including towards inaction. If a startup is gaining
rapid market share by using a game-changing technology, for
instance, inaction may be preferable. Absent such compelling
evidence to the contrary, however, there is strong support for
defaulting to pursuing a breakup remedy when deciding between breakups and inaction.
In summary, the design of remedies should reflect antitrust law's institutional and political constraints. When the
cost-benefit analysis yields a clear preferable remedy in any
given case, that remedy should be adopted. However, in many
cases economic analysis will fail to yield any firm conclusion as
to the best remedy. In light of the existing constraints on antitrust agencies and trials, a purportedly neutral approach may
produce outcomes counter to what antitrust most needs given
the pressures toward under-deterrence. Furthermore, a working hypothesis that begins with breakups as the preferred remedy and resolves ambiguity in their favor would result in more
actual breakups. This approach would thus produce the data
points needed to reassess the hypothesis and readjust the legal
framework in accordance with up-to-date, sophisticated empirics rather than outdated studies, historical anecdotes, and intuition. As a practical matter, a breakup default may be
necessary to right the course toward eventually choosing
breakups on the merits.
C.

Expanding Breakups

Greater clarity about administering breakups speaks to
perhaps the most controversial antitrust entity: the monopoly
that did not obtain its dominance through mergers and has
done nothing illegal. As a matter of law, "monopolists are permitted to keep their lawfully acquired market positions so long
as they do not engage in exclusionary practices." 3 48 Those
firms can charge monopoly prices.
347
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This Article does not establish that society would be better
off by getting rid of the conduct requirement and prohibiting
monopolies obtained by "superior skill, foresight and industry." 3 4 9 However, in two main ways a more comprehensive understanding of breakups weakens the existing antitrust
allowance of such "successful" monopolies. First, the leading
justification for allowing monopolies to exist and to charge monopolistic prices is to provide incentives for innovation and
investment. 3 5 0 Most famously, Justice Antonin Scalia
explained:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it
is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is
351
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.

DOJ officials have echoed those concerns by citing the
need "to protect the very incentives to innovate" as the leading,
if not the only, obstacle to breakups. 35 2 In particular, the articulated fear is discouraging entrepreneurs from starting up a
company. 3 53
In other words, innovation is the principal concern about
breaking up firms that charge monopoly prices. Absent that
concern, society would be better off ending the consumer welfare harms caused by monopoly pricing. This argument in
favor of monopolies is powerful due to the consensus that innovation is a significant driver of economic growth and progressindeed, for many, innovation is the most important contributor
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to growth. 3 5 4 In arguing for structural remedies, scholars have
often left the innovation incentives argument alone. 3 5 5
Protecting innovation is valuable. However, in light of what
breakups can accomplish as a remedy, innovation concerns do
not support the current antitrust permissiveness of successdriven monopolies. To assess that concern, it bears emphasis
that breaking up an organic monopoly would only happen
when a company becomes extremely successful. That constraint means that the breakup could unfold in a way that
would offer those who built the company sufficient rewards for
their innovation.
To illustrate, consider how the innovation source of resistance to breakups would play out for Google, Facebook, and
Amazon, which are currently leading targets for breakups. If
Amazon were split into several companies-say its cloud computing business, its Amazon-owned sales business, and a platform-founder and CEO Jeff Bezos would still own stakes in
enormous companies and still be among the wealthiest
humans ever to exist, like Rockefeller was after the government
carved up Standard 011.356 It is hard to imagine future entrepreneurs would look to Bezos at that point and somehow be
discouraged from following similar paths.
As further perspective, consider a hypothetical in which
Amazon and Facebook were shut down by some antitrust administrative mistake without compensating their founders. In
such a scenario, Bezos and Zuckerberg would still be extraordinarily wealthy, since not all of their wealth is tied up in their
companies. It is not clear that, even under those circumstances, entrepreneurs would be discouraged from a path in
which the worst-case antitrust scenario is extremely unlikely
and would still leave them well-off and famous. Moreover, if
such outcomes occurred by mistake, reforms could be implemented to change the breakup process. To be clear, this Article
does not propose such a scenario, which would be risky from
the perspective of innovation incentives and consumer welfare.
Still, the hypothetical is informative because it shows the limited downsides as measured by the innovation argument's
main concern.
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Also, the sale of the company's assets can be assessed
before completing the forced deal. If the proposed sale would
leave the monopoly's founders and investors uncompensated
to a degree that might discourage future innovation, the government could change course. That approach would address
scholarly concerns about making investments in research and
development unprofitable. The current policy of blanket
prohibitions of breakups even when they would leave innovators amply compensated-a policy justified by concerns about
those innovators-is inconsistent with the prevalence of profit357
able private divestitures that leave shareholders better off.
Additionally, a defining feature of entrepreneurship is
"high risk." 3 5 8 The vast majority of startups fail to yield significant returns on investment. 3 5 9 If by error, antitrust enforcement happened to erase the wealth of an innovator who created
a monopoly, it would be counterintuitive to assume such rare
occurrences would discourage a group of people who are already undeterred by long odds. Of course, if breakups routinely wiped out the wealth of entrepreneurs, that would
change incentives. Again, though, the historical record does
not indicate that breakups impoverish entrepreneurs.
Despite the existing policy's questionable foundations,
concerns about harming innovation should still inform the design of any no-fault monopolization standard. 3 6 0 As mentioned
above, when the remedy responds to a consummated merger or
other illegal conduct, a breakup may need to be accompanied
by disgorgement or penalties to sufficiently deter anticompetitive practices. However, when breakups are used against monopoly power obtained legally-by offering a better productsuch a penalty need not be part of the remedy. The goal would
be to remove or lower the ability to exercise monopoly power.
By allowing the entrepreneur in such situations to split up the
successful monopoly and reap the rewards of the market price
of that sale, antitrust law can address the harms from monopolies and the concerns about discouraging monopolies built on
successful products.
357

See supra subpart III.A.

See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust's "Curseof Bigness" Problem, 118 MICH. L.
REv. 1259, 1275 (2020) (book review).
359 William R. Kerr, Ramana Nanda & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Entrepreneurship as Experimentation, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (2014).
358

360 On the importance of innovation informing antitrust remedies, see Keith N.
Hylton, A Unified Frameworkfor Competition Policy and InnovationPolicy, 22 TEx.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 169-73 (2014).

2018

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1955

The innovation discussion in this subpart has so far focused on incentives to innovate up to the point of becoming a
monopoly because that is the chief justification for the current
antitrust regime. A related issue is worth considering briefly,
albeit of secondary importance: What would be the effects on
innovation moving forward of breaking up a monopoly? Antitrust scholars are divided on how such an intervention would
affect innovation, 3 6 1 but those debates omit the private sector's
perspective on breakups. Many large firms have broken themselves up to become more innovative. 36 2 There is reason to
believe monopolies would be unlikely to pursue such innovation-improving divestitures if the effect would be to lessen their
monopoly rents.
Thus, although it is beyond the scope here to settle the
broader debate about innovation and antitrust, the most prominent normative foundation for allowing monopolies is in tension with the business sector view of breakups and innovation.
It is inaccurate to state that we must tolerate monopoly prices
because doing so is vital to motivating innovation. A more
refined understanding of breakups shows that antitrust law
can have it both ways by breaking up some currently lawful
monopolies.
Moving beyond innovation, the rehabilitation of breakups
informs debates about reforming antitrust law's treatment of
successful monopolies. The law's permissiveness towards monopolies is easier to defend from a paradigm of unwieldy breakups. If breakups are viewed as disastrous or radical, there may
be no viable remedy for a company that acquired and maintained its monopoly power legally. Behavioral remedies could
work in some situations, but there would be no wrongful conduct to fix for an otherwise law-abiding firm.
Moreover, to preserve innovation incentives an organic monopoly would presumably need to be compensated by competitors for providing access. That would require the government
to oversee the pricing of that access over time. Even more
problematic would be situations in which access and traditional behavioral remedies do not fit. In those cases, the only
remedy that would address monopoly prices may be price control or the government setting the price of the monopoly's products at something reflecting the competitive level. Yet price
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controls are economically disfavored. 3 6 3 In other words, one of
the potential obstacles to reforming antitrust law to prosecute
more monopolies is the uncertainty how to intervene. An informed view of breakups provides a workable and promising
remedy. There would need to be other reasons to want to allow
the law to continue permitting monopolies, rather than due to
the absence of a feasible remedy.
It merits emphasis that there is room for large businesses
and some concentrated markets that bring more benefit to consumers and society than alternatives. Some companies, such
as social networks, are limited in how far they can be broken
up in the traditional sense without ruining what is valuable to
consumers. 3 6 4 The costs of a breakup, including any pro-competitive benefits of leaving the violator as a single company,
must be considered when choosing a remedy. Also, courts
should remain skeptical when it is not the government seeking
the breakup, but a competitor suing its rival. A more expansive
vision for breakups may be in order, but that does not mean
that the government should go on a rampage to fragment all
industries.
That said, the question of when a broken-up industry
would improve consumer welfare is not the focus of this Article.
Rather, the main point is that some of the key foundations for
the current near-universal allowance of organic monopolies
erode when viewed in the context of what is known about governance and divestitures outside of antitrust. There are other
non-economic reasons some may oppose or support antitrust
breakups of organic monopolies. 3 6 5 But the leading economic
foundations for allowing monopolies-providing motivation to
innovate-are conjectural. Those foundations also sit in tension with widespread business practices, history, and a common-sense consideration of the example set by wealthy
founders of broken up companies.
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In contrast, there are well-established consumer welfare
harms caused by a firm charging monopoly prices. 36 6 Thus,
the main economic argument cited by Supreme Court justices,
scholars, and antitrust authorities does not hold as the foundation for a universal rule that monopolies should not be broken up.
A more accurate understanding of administrability illuminates not only the flaws in the current regime, but also the
path forward. It is possible to construct an antitrust policy
that reflects both a valid emphasis on innovation and the economic value of limiting monopoly power. Legislative reforms
could, for companies who obtained and maintained excess monopoly power lawfully, seek to break up those companies when
possible to do so in a way that both preserves the core appeal to
consumers and rewards the entrepreneurs for their innovation.
Like in other areas of antitrust, judicial review would provide a
check on abuse of such power.
Note that this proposal channels the leading scholarly justification of the status quo-innovation incentives-into designing a better approach to administering breakups. The
framework is likewise consistent with Justice Scalia's emphasis on allowing monopoly profits "at least for a short period,"
since-unlike in the case of monopolies obtained or maintained
by unlawful conduct-breaking up lawful monopolies would
not involve disgorgement of those prior monopoly profits.
Without breakups, there will sometimes be nothing that
antitrust can do to advance competition. Greater openness to
breakups should be pursued because they address the clear
harm of monopolies instead of emphasizing unproven risks of
disastrous breakups or stifled innovation. Removing breakups'
administrative misperceptions will recharge the law's power to
combat monopolies and make the field less vulnerable to accusations of "irrelevance." 3 6 7 When breakups would benefit society, lawmakers and enforcers should not hesitate to use
them-even in the face of monopolies previously thought
untouchable.
CONCLUSION

Antitrust would benefit from a more interdisciplinary examination of breakups, drawing on both administrative law
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scholarship and business scholarship. An outside-of-antitrust
lens, along with a closer look at the existing case against breakups, reveals that the widespread, deeply ingrained antitrust
hostility to breakups is unfounded. There is insufficient evidence that government-mandated breakups have harmed the
economy. Moreover, business executives and shareholders
regularly initiate breakups as part of good corporate governance. Owners overall emerge from those events wealthier than
before, despite substantial costs, delays, and organizational
upheaval. Antitrust authorities are being held to a standard of
success that would cripple private sector mergers and acquisitions. Unless evidence emerges suggesting that such interventions are harmful, enforcers and courts should more liberally
pursue breakups, and legislators should consider expanding
the remedy's reach to currently legal monopolies.
Indeed, it is quite possible that even the breakup of incorrectly targeted companies could yield benefits to the economy
and to the company. CEOs often pursue counterproductive
empire building, thus producing more unmanageable companies that are unable to adapt with modern fast-changing markets. Many antitrust breakups would also yield non-antitrust
efficiency and innovation gains currently omitted from the antitrust analysis. Although indiscriminate breakups would be
counterproductive, these obscured gains show that the risks of
incorrect identification are not as grave as characterized.
Most importantly, the potential upside for competition, and
society, is substantial. Perhaps a better analogy for antitrust
than unscrambling eggs is that controlled burns help reinvigorate forests, allowing ecosystems to regenerate and emerge
more resilient than before. The working hypothesis moving
forward should be that more breakups would have a similar
effect on markets by incurring short-term costs in the service of
preserving market health and competition in the long term.
The only way to test that hypothesis is to begin exercising the
authority that has long existed and that lawmakers and antitrust authorities have become irrationally reluctant to use. Doing so may not only end the mismanagement of the ultimate
antitrust remedy, but also free the field from any enforcement
paralysis.
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